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Italy’s Privatization Process and Its Implications for China 
 
Summary 
This report provides an overview of the causes and consequences of the Italian State-
owned Enterprises (SOE) reform process. Particularly, it analyzes the symbiotic link 
between share issue privatization (SIP), i.e. privatization in public equity markets, and 
financial market development, and shows how the sustained policy of sales has 
jumpstarted the Italian domestic stock market. Based on the Italian and international 
experience, the report provides some possible guidelines and policy recommendations 
in order to achieve the same goal in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). 
 
 
Keywords: State-owned enterprises, Share issue privatization, Financial development, 
Italy, China 
 
JEL Classification: L33, L30, O16, G14 
 
The author wishes to thank Yongbeom Kim (World Bank) for his guidance and support 
throughout the project. Irene Ho (World Bank) provided very helpful assistance and 
insights. The author registers his gratitude for the cooperation and warm hospitality 
rendered by various stakeholders, including: Wang Wei (China M&A Management 
Holding); Bi Mingjian and Lin Shou Kang (China International Capital Corporation); 
Gilbert van Kerckhove (China Strategy Limited); Xie Jun and Zhou Fangsheng 
(SASAC); Li Keping (National Council for Social Security Fund); Li Liang (China 
Security Regulatory Commission); Fang Xinghai, Hu Ruyin, Feng Bo (Shanghai Stock 
Exchange);  Ma Guoqiang (Shanghai Baosteel Group); Xie Zhichun (Everbright 
Securities); Gao Shanwen (Everbright Securities); Charlie Ye (Bank of China 
International); Li Chunping, Robert Zhou (Guotai Asset Management); Zhang Qi, Eric 
Fang (Haitong Securities); Liu Yan (Datang Power); Wu Mengfei (China Oilfields 
Services Limited).  
The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the author. They do not necessarily represent the view of the World Bank, its 






Address for correspondence: 
 
Bernardo Bortolotti 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 






   2
 
TABLES OF CONTENTS
ITALY’S PRIVATIZATION PROCESS AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR CHINA .................... 1 
ABBREVIATIONS................................................................................................................................ 3 
INTRODUCTION................................................................................................................................. 5 
1  HISTORICAL BACKGROUND................................................................................................ 8 
2  OBJECTIVES, STRATEGIES, AND PLAYERS..................................................................... 9 
3  MILESTONES........................................................................................................................... 12 
3.1 THE PRELIMINARY STAGE............................................................................................................ 13 
3.2 THE START-UP STAGE .................................................................................................................. 13 
3.3 THE “CORE” STAGE...................................................................................................................... 14 
3.4 THE CONSOLIDATION STAGE........................................................................................................ 15 
4  METHODS................................................................................................................................. 16 
4.1 PRIVATIZE BANKS FIRST .............................................................................................................. 16 
4.2 PUBLIC OFFERS AS A STRATEGIC CHOICE ..................................................................................... 17 
4.3 THE ALLOCATION OF SHARES....................................................................................................... 19 
4.4 THE DESIGN OF OWNERSHIP STRUCTURES.................................................................................... 20 
4.5 THE SPECIAL POWERS OF THE STATE............................................................................................ 21 
5  THE LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR PRIVATIZATION23 
5.1 CORPORATIZATION AND REORGANIZATION OF THE SOE SECTOR................................................ 24 
5.2 PRIVATIZATION PROCEDURES...................................................................................................... 25 
5.3 UTILITY REGULATION.................................................................................................................. 26 
5.4 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE.......................................................................................................... 27 
5.5 SECURITIES MARKET REGULATION .............................................................................................. 29 
6  ASSESSMENT OF PRIVATIZATION’S IMPACT ON STOCK MARKET 
DEVELOPMENT................................................................................................................................ 30 
6.1 MARKET SIZE AND LIQUIDITY...................................................................................................... 30 
6.2 THE EQUITY SHIFT ....................................................................................................................... 31 
6.3 INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS.......................................................................................................... 32 
7  IMPLICATIONS FOR CHINA................................................................................................ 34 
7.1 BACKGROUND ............................................................................................................................. 34 
7.2 THE PRESENT FINANCIAL AND INSTITUTIONAL LANDSCAPE OF SOE REFORM.............................. 36 
7.3 PRINCIPLES.................................................................................................................................. 38 
7.4 RESHAPING THE SOE SECTOR TO FOSTER CAPITAL MARKET DEVELOPMENT ............................... 39 
8  CONCLUSIONS........................................................................................................................ 43 
REFERENCES.................................................................................................................................... 45 




ABO Accelerated  book-built  offer 
ADR  Aeroporti di Roma 
ADR/GDR  American/Global Depository Receipts 
BCI  Banca Commerciale Italiana 
BNL  Banca Nazionale del Lavoro 
BNP  Banque Nationale de Paris 
BP British  Petroleum 
CIP  Comitato Interministeriale Prezzi 
CIPE  Inter-ministerial Committee for Economic Planning 
CONSOB Commissione  Nazionale per le Società e la Borsa 
CSRC  China Securities Regulatory Commission 
EC European  Commission 
ECU  European Currency Unit 
EDF  Electricité de France 
EFIM  Ente Partecipazioni e Finanziamento Industrie Manifatturiere 
ENEL  Ente Nazionale Energia Elettrica 
ENI  Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi 
ETI  Ente Tabacchi Italiano 
EU European  Union 
FS  Ferrovie dello Stato 
GAAP  Generally Accepted Accounting Practice 
GDP  Gross Domestic Product 
Genco Generation  Company 
GRTN   Gestore della Rete di Trasmissione Nazionale 
GSM  Global System for Mobile Communication 
3G 3rd  Generation 
IMI  Istituto Mobiliare Italiano 
INA  Istituto Nazioanle delle Assicurazioni 
IPOs  Initial Public Offerings 
IRAs Independent  Regulatory  Agencies 
IRI  Istituto per la Ricostruzuine Industriale 
IT Information  technology 
ITL   Italian Lira (Italian currency: Lira) 
KIO  Kuwait Investment Office 
LSE  London Stock Exchange 
M&As  Mergers and Acquisitions 
MBO Management  buy-outs 
MEF  Ministry of Economy and Finance 
MOF  Ministry of Finance 
MP  Member of Parliament  
MW MegaWatt 
NSSF National  Social Security Fund 
NYSE  New York Stock Exchange 
OECD  Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
OTC  Over the Counter 
P/E Price/Earnings   4
PAYG Pay-as-You-Go 
PC Privatization  Commission 
PM Prime  Minister 
PO   Public Offer of Shares 
PP.TT  Ministero delle Poste e Telecomunicazioni 
PRC  People’s Republic of China 
QFII  Qualifying Foreign Institutional Investors 
RAI Radio  Televisione  Italiana 
RMB  Renminbi (Chinese currency: Yuan) 
ROE  Return on Equity 
SASAC  State-owned Asset Supervision and Administration 
SEAQ  Stock Exchange Automated Quotations International 
SEC  Securities and Exchange Commission 
SIP Share  Issue  Privatization 
SME  Società Meridionale di Elettricità 
SOE(s)  State -Owned Enterprise(s) 
STET Società  Torinese  Esercizi Telefonici 
TI Telecom  Italia 
TSO  Transmission System Operator 
UK United  Kingdom 
US United  States 
WTO  World Trade Organization 
WWII World  War  II 





Until the beginning of the 1990s, the state sector in Italy was large and pervasive. 
The SOE relative contribution to value added, employment, and fixed capital 
formation was above the European average. State-owned banks played also a major 
role in financial intermediation accounting for more than 70 per cent of total loans 
and deposits. 
 
SOEs were conceived as industrial and social policy instruments rather than profit 
maximizing entities. They typically operated under strong political interference and 
were forced to absorb unemployment, support investment, and rescue ailing firms. 
As a consequence, their operating and financial performance was very weak as 
compared to private peers. 
 
Under the pressure of a mounting debt and deficits, Italy’s fiscal conditions rapidly 
deteriorated at the beginning of the 1990s at times when the country was also 
experiencing one of the most acute political crisis of the post-war period, with 
SOEs involved in systematic corruption and large scandals. 
 
In 1993, Italy embarked in a large-scale privatization process mainly aimed at fiscal 
stabilization as a requisite to join the European Monetary Union. Results have been 
outstanding. Over a decade, Italy implemented 70 major sales raising 
approximately US$108bn of privatization proceeds mainly through public offers of 
shares, placing Italy in the third and fourth position in the global ranking by 
revenues and transactions, respectively. The size of the SOE sector has shrunk 
dramatically due to the complete divestiture of the state banks, telecommunications, 
and manufacturing industries. State holdings have also been substantially reduced 
in utilities and former monopolistic sectors, although the government, as in other 
industrialized countries,  remains an influential shareholder in several privatized 
firms. 
 
Major institutional innovations were needed to allow the consistent implementation 
of such an ambitious program. The more immediate steps have been the 
transformation of state entities operating under public law into joint stock 
corporations and the centralization of decision-making in the hands of the Ministry 
of the Economy and Finance (MEF), which retained most of the power. In the 
actual implementation of the program, the MEF liaised with IRI (Istituto per la 
Ricostruzione Industriale), charged with the current management of most SOE 
assets. 
 
The privatization strategy consistently implemented throughout the 1990s foresaw 
several steps. First, the immediate divestiture of State banks was considered a top 
priority of the program as a more competitive financial sector mobilizes resources 
more efficiently and promotes economic growth. Importantly, privatized banks 
developed investment banking services used as inputs in the privatization of non-
financial firms. Second, in order to pursue the objective of stock market 
development, the governments opted for public offers of shares (PO). Shares were   6
moderately underpriced to foster the participation of domestic retail investors. 
Furthermore, issues were structured in most cases as multi-tranche offerings 
involving foreign and domestic institutional investors and typically associated with 
over-allotment (green shoe) options to stabilize prices in the after-market. Third, in 
a few companies deemed strategic for the national economy, the government 
introduced golden shares mechanisms which allowed to maintain public control in 
privatized companies and to protect relevant public interests. 
 
The structural change that privatization involved was backed by careful 
institutional design. During the implementation of the process, major innovations 
were introduced in the legislative framework. First, a comprehensive privatization 
law was enacted establishing rules, responsibilities, and procedures to regulate the 
practical implementation of privatization sales. Second, de novo regulatory 
institutions and principles were created to avoid distortions in non-competitive 
sectors and network industries. Third, new rules were set to improve corporate 
governance and the efficiency of the financial system. Particularly, corporate 
governance reform has strongly improved the legal protection of minority investors. 
 
The privatization process had a dramatic effect on the Italian financial system. 
During the period, market capitalization almost tripled and market activity, in terms 
of trading value, increased more than 15 times. A large part of this market 
development can be ascribed to the floatation of privatized companies’ shares, 
which now account for a large fraction of the total market capitalization, volume of 
trades, and free float.  
 
The supply of shares of privatized companies has radically changed the investor 
base and contributed to the equity shift in Italy. A massive reallocation of 
household savings from government-backed securities to equity occurred during the 
period. Foreign investors backed this equity shift by investing in government bonds 
and shares of newly privatized companies, becoming key players in the actual 
financial system. 
 
While the privatization process advanced, households became more familiar with 
equity investment, and progressively demanded more sophisticated financial 
services to insure better diversification of their portfolios. This demand combined 
with new investment opportunities in privatized SOEs, fostered the development of 
institutional investors, especially open-end mutual funds which have been 
increasing their operating activity throughout the 1990s. 
 
Some lessons could be drawn from the Italian experience in advising strategies for 
privatization and capital market development in the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC).  
 
PRC has already taken important steps in SOE reform and capital market 
development. Therefore in advising on the future of State sell-offs, it is important to 
take stock of previous experience and current developments in the economic and 
institutional setting. 
 
Since the establishment of the two major exchanges, PRC has witnessed a dramatic 
growth in domestic stock markets due to the floatation of more than 1,300 newly   7
corporatized SOEs. In the meantime, better performing companies successfully 
tapped international investors in major foreign exchanges. PRC has also 
rationalized the administration of the SOE sector by establishing the State-owned 
Asset Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), a ministerial level 
authority performing the responsibilities of the investor in 189 large groups owned 
by the central government. Furthermore a set of reforms promoted by the China 
Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) and stock exchanges has substantially 
improved corporate governance in listed companies. Finally, important steps have 
been made in terms of gradual capital market opening to overseas investors, 
allowing the establishment of foreign joint-ventures (JV) and Qualifying Foreign 
Institutional Investors (QFII). 
 
PRC could leverage on these important results and consolidate financial market 
development via the transfer of ownership rights in SOEs to the private sector. In 
order to target the objective, such a policy should adopt the following principles. 
 
First, better performing SOEs should be given higher priority to share issue 
privatization.  The quantity of shares should be such to generate critical mass effect 
and spur the listing of private companies as well. Second, the overhang of non-
tradable shares should be addressed soon.  Even a partial transfer of non-tradable 
shares to private investors can have significant effects in improving incentives in 
SOEs, bringing the size of SOE sector in PRC gradually closer to the physiological 
levels of more advanced market economies. Third, insider privatization should be 
minimized. Indeed, management buy-outs (MBO) are less likely to occur at fair 
values given that one party enjoys private information. On the other hand, sales 
should be designed to attract outsiders, such as retail, institutional, strategic, and 
foreign investors, and all those stakeholders interested in the maximization of the 
value of the assets. Fourth, legal and institutional framework for privatization needs 
to be strengthened.  
 
Several policy recommendations can be drawn from these principles. First, the 
Italian experience suggests that the  proper timing for the transfer of shares of SOEs 
might be: banks first, then SOEs operating under competitive conditions, and 
finally regulated utilities. Second, sales should be structured as multi-tranche 
offerings, with a preferential allocation to domestic retail investors, in combination 
with strategic underpricing and bonus shares. Institutional investors should also be 
involved to provide a more accurate pricing of shares. Third, the pricing of non-
tradable shares should be carried out taking into account not only the interests of 
the existing floating shareholders, but also the high quality of the assets and the 
liquidity premium stemming from the transfer program. Fourth, the golden shares 
mechanism could be used in specific circumstances to protect strategic and public 
interests in the PRC. Finally, measures to improve market regulation and corporate  
governance should be introduced to sustain the transfer program and foster 
financial market development.   8
 
1  Historical background 
 
Italy had a long tradition of state ownership of productive assets. Historically, the 
state-owned enterprise sector was mainly represented by the state-owned industrial 
holding IRI which was established in 1933 with the aim to rescue some of the 
major Italian banks and firms severely hit by the 1929 crisis. IRI had been 
expanding its activity in the domestic economy during the post WWII 
reconstruction period and throughout the 1970s and 1980s. At the end of the 1980s, 
the SOE holdings were pervasive in nearly all branches of economic activity, but 
especially in infrastructures, public utilities, oil and gas, steel, manufacturing, 
banking and insurance. In 1991, twelve out of the twenty top firms by turnover and 
more than one third of the top fifty were fully state-owned. As a consequence, Italy 
ranked high in Europe in terms of the SOE relative contribution to value added, 
employment, and fixed capital formation (see Figure 1). State-owned banks also 
played a major role in financial intermediation accounting for more than 70 per cent 
of total loans and deposits (Inzerillo and Missori, 2002). 
 
The control structure of the SOE sector was extremely complex and characterized 
by the involvement of different bodies of the public administration: (i) state holding 
companies; (ii) public entities; (iii) ministries or local government bodies (see 
Figures 2 and 3). Until 1992, the majority of state assets were owned by three large 
holding companies: IRI, ENI (Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi) and EFIM (Ente 
Partecipazioni e Finanziamento Industrie Manifaturiere), under the direct control of 
the Ministry of State Holdings. IRI was a conglomerate with a highly diversified 
portfolio of assets in the industrial and financial sector. ENI was mainly involved in 
oil and gas, while EFIM in defense, transports and aluminum. The most important 
public entities were ENEL (Ente Nazionale per l’Energia Elettrica), the electricity 
state monopoly, IMI (Istituto Mobiliare Italiano), a special credit financial 
institution, and Banca Nazionale del Lavoro (BNL). The largest entities owned by 
ministries were Ferrovie dello Stato (FS), operating the railway system, and PP.TT 
(Ministero delle Poste e Telecomunicazioni), managing the postal and 
telecommunication services. 
 
The vast majority of SOEs were running under public law and subject to strong 
political interference at various levels. Political power in firms was highly 
dispersed and shared among different players, such as the Ministry of State 
Holdings, several inter-ministerial committees, the government, and politicians 
sitting in boards of directors with an inflated number of seats. Furthermore, 
management independence was curbed by the involvement of SOEs in medium and 
long term planning decisions. In this context, public firms were more conceived as 
instruments for industrial and social policies and widely used to absorb 
unemployment, support investment, and rescue ailing firms (Goldstein and 
Nicoletti, 2003). 
 
Not surprisingly, the financial and operating performance of SOEs was generally 
poor as compared to private counterparts. The relative performance of SOEs started 
to worsen at the end of the 1980s and deteriorated dramatically at the beginning of 
the 1990s. As of end 1991, the combined turnover in terms of total sales of major   9
groups such as IRI, ENI, ENEL was worth US$131bn with net income of less than 
one billion. Consolidated statements of the IRI group reported a loss of US$313ml 
(in terms of net income). Total financial liabilities were US$97bn with a net worth 
of US$62bn. The financial position of EFIM was even more serious. With 
US$11bn of debt (1 percent of GDP), this large conglomerate was very close to the 
financial default, which indeed occurred in 1992 (Ministero del Tesoro, 1992). 
 
These inefficiencies at the microeconomic level rapidly spilled over also at the 
macroeconomic level. Fiscal conditions steadily deteriorated during the 1980s due 
to the increasing flows of state subsidies to the SOE sector. Central government 
debt mounted up to more than 100 per cent of GDP, under the pressure of 
increasing fiscal deficits worth on average 10 percent of GDP. In the same period, 
servicing of the debt became more and more problematic due to the increase of 
interest rates (especially vis-à-vis German Treasury bonds) and country risk. 
 
Indeed, during this period Italy was experiencing one of the most acute institutional 
and political crises of the post-war period. Prosecutors unveiled a widespread 
corruption of politicians at the MP level and public officials, with SOEs often 
involved in large scale scandals. Furthermore, during the summer of 1992, the two 
top prosecutors Falcone and Borsellino were killed by the Mafia. 
 
The shaky economic and political outlook was certainly one of the key drivers in 
the speculative attack against the Lira in mid 1992. The currency suffered a strong 
devaluation, by losing - one summer - 20 percent against the Deutsche Mark. 
 
This is the background against which after the April 1992 general elections the 
government led by PM Giuliano Amato - heading a wide center-left coalition - 
decided to launch the first large-scale privatization process in Italy. The 
privatization policy has then been pursued consistently throughout the 1990s by a 
series of coalitional governments with a strong involvement of technocrats, and 
without ideological bias. Although political debates ignited on privatization 
methods, the privatization policy per se has seldom been politically challenged. 
Governments of all political stripes realized that privatization was the most 
appropriate policy to achieve the fiscal consolidation needed to meet the 
convergence criteria established by the European Commission. In that respect, the 
negative shock on the Italian economy made possible a general agreement on a 





2  Objectives, strategies, and players 
 
The objectives of the privatization program are officially stated in a document 
(Libro Verde sulle Partecipazioni dello Stato) drafted by a Committee of 
independent experts appointed by the MEF and presented before the Parliament on 
November 1992. 
   10
The main objectives were the following: (i) to enhance the competitiveness of the 
productive system; (ii) to promote financial market development; (iii) to foster the 
internationalization of firms in the prospect of globalization and increased 
European integration. A secondary objective was to improve fiscal conditions and 
particularly to curb public debt. 
 
This ambitious agenda had to be pursued by implementing a privatization strategy 
made of several steps. 
 
1.  the immediate corporatization of the largest chunks of the SOE sector. This 
policy foresaw the transformation of public entities into joint stock 
corporations and the transfer of the shares to the MEF. 
 
2.  the suppression of the Ministry for State Holdings and the centralization of 
the decision-making on privatization issues in the hands of the MEF, which 
retained most of the powers. The MEF acted in concert with the newly 
corporatized IRI, which owned a large fraction of the assets to-be-privatized. 
 
3.  a thorough analysis of the entire SOE sector in order to evaluate the 
profitability of the firms, which had to be classified into several categories 
according to performance. Particularly, this evaluation process had to be 
carried out in order to separate sellable firms from those needing capital 
injections and assets to attract buyers. 
 
4.  the definition of clear rules about the use of privatization proceeds, which 
should have been allocated preferentially to the reduction of public debt. 
 
5.  sequencing of the privatization sales, which should start with banks and 
financial institutions as stronger financial intermediaries could be important 
actors for the success of future privatizations. 
 
6.  the preference (where possible) given to public offers of shares – in 
domestic and/or international markets – in order to spread ownership 
diffusion and to deepen the financial system. 
 
7.  the definition of a clear institutional framework based on a privatization  
law, providing rules, guidelines, and procedures, limiting discretion and 
political interference, and on suitable regulation of monopolies, network 
industries, and security markets. 
 
The main player involved in the practical design of this privatization strategy was 
the MEF, the largest shareholder of newly corporatized SOEs. However, by no 
means the MEF acted in a political and institutional vacuum. The MEF had the duty 
of formulating proposals on privatization to a committee of three ministries – MEF, 
Budget and Planning, and Industry – and final decisions had to be approved by the 
Council of the Ministries, chaired by the Prime Ministry. Furthermore, since 1993 a 
Global Advisory Committee on Privatization was established to provide expert 
advice and to ensure transparency to sales. However, the MEF has been playing the 
key role of agenda setter in privatization issues, liaising with state holding 
companies and with the management of SOEs.   11
 
Among these, the newly corporatized IRI holding group played a very active role in 
the divestiture of its highly diversified portfolio of assets. In 1992, IRI owned more 
than one thousand firms operating in the industrial, banking, and services sectors 
(Figure 4). Although large differences were apparent within the group, companies 
in IRI’s portfolio were generally characterized by a weak financial position and 
large operating deficits. This weakness was particularly serious as the majority of 
these firms needed resources to finance investment which the state could not 
provide any longer without incurring in a violation of European Commission 
regulations on state subsidies. In such a context, with the progressive downgrading 
of credit rating of the IRI group, restructuring and privatization appeared the 
unavoidable choice. The path towards divestiture was made even steeper by an 
important agreement signed on December 1993 by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 
Beniamino Andreatta, and the EU Competition Commissioner, Karel Van Miert. 
According to that agreement, the IRI group's debt was to be cut, by the end of 1996, 
to a level that would be acceptable to a private operator in a market economy. The 
Italian government then had to reduce its holdings in any of the group's subsidiaries 
in which it was the sole shareholder.
1 
 
The signing of this agreement accelerated the restructuring and divestiture of IRI 
holdings. The MEF co-ordinated with IRI a large-scale reorganization process 
which involved the immediate sales of better performing SOEs, such as banks and 
manufacturing companies, and a strategic use of proceeds to facilitate the 
restructuring of less performing companies and to cut the group’s debt. During the 
1990s, this sustained reorganization policy allowed IRI to curb leverage to the 
levels agreed upon with the EU and to distribute in 1997 a dividend to its 
shareholders, 65 years after its establishment. 
 
It may be useful to contrast these aspects of the Italian privatizations with those of 
the two main developed countries involved in the process, namely the United 
Kingdom and France. As far as the long-term objectives are concerned, 
privatization policy in these countries had stronger ideological motivations than the 
Italian one. In the United Kingdom, it has been implemented under three 
consecutive Conservative legislatures (from 1979 to 1991) and aimed at 
denationalizing the economy, curbing union power, and fostering popular 
capitalism with re-election concerns.
2  French privatizations are also shaped by 
partisan politics with waves of divestitures associated with right-wing governments 
in office. However, French governments have been usually short lived therefore 
privatization policy has been sometimes  reversed (by re-nationalizations) or halted 
by left-wing governments. 
 
                                                 
1 The Commission has made its decision to extend the agreement conditional on compliance with the 
following undertakings: privatization of the companies Autostrade, Finmare (sea transport) and Seat 
(part of the STET (Società Torinese Esercizi Telefonici) group), the sale of Stet Telecommunications 
to the MEF and the sale of minority holdings, such as that in Banca di Roma. Compliance with these 
undertakings would reduce IRI's indebtedness by some ITL 19,000 bn (ECU 9,938.6 mil). 
2 Indeed the newly created class of small shareholders would be inclined to support market-oriented 
platforms at future elections. Machiavellian privatization may therefore explain the electoral success of 
the Conservatives (Biais and Perotti, 2002).   12
Despite these important differences, privatization policy in the UK and in France 
was also aimed at fostering financial development and revitalizing national 
exchanges. The United Kingdom pursued this objective by implementing strongly 
underpriced public offers of shares. France followed a similar path, often opting for 
public floatations in combination with a direct placement (ranging from 20 to 30 
percent of capital) to a group of national strategic shareholders (the so-called noyau 
dur). 
 
In all three countries, the primary institution responsible for the implementation of 
the process is the Ministry of Finance (MOF). In France, the MOF supervises and 
coordinates the privatization operations and is supported by an ad hoc Privatization 
Commission (PC) established by law and made of independent experts. In contrast 
with the Italian Global Advisory Committee, the French PC is not advisory, but it is 
charged with the duty to select advisors and to formulate binding proposals on 
minimum selling prices. On the contrary, all the main privatization decisions are 
taken by the MOF, acting in concert with the so-called sponsoring minister, which 
changed according to the company to be privatized. Differently from Italy and 
France, the British government wields wide discretionary power over privatization, 
which is not governed by any special legislation (Chiri and Panetta, 1994). 
3  Milestones  
 
From 1985 to 2003, Italy implemented  70 major sales
3 raising  approximately  
US$108(nominal)bn of privatization proceeds mainly through public offers of 
shares and private equity placements (see Table 1) (Securities Data Corporation). 
The size of the privatization process has certainly been remarkable. As of 2000, 
Italy boasts a third and fourth position in the global ranking by revenues and 
transactions, respectively (see Table 2). In terms of aggregate proceeds, Italy lags 
behind only the UK, a country where privatization has been pushed to the full 
extent, and Japan, which has raised the majority of revenues through a few colossal 
transactions which took place in the mid 1980s under positive market conditions. 
The data on revenues as a percentage of GDP show that Italy remains in a 
prominent position when the size of the country is properly accounted for.  
 
The Italian privatization process can be subdivided in four stages: (i) the 
preliminary stage spanning the 1980s until 1991; (ii) the start-up stage, from 1992 
to 1995; (iii) the “core” stage, from 1996 to 2000, when major sales are 
concentrated; (iv) the consolidation stage after the global crisis, from 2001 to date 









                                                 
3 Major sales” are considered transactions worth more than US$100mil.   13
3.1 The preliminary stage 
 
Starting from the late 1970s, the financial position of the IRI group started to 
deteriorate. The excessive growth of investments, the limited scope of self-
financing, the structural crisis of entire sectors such as steel and construction, 
coupled with the widespread losses in several other areas of activity inflated 
consolidated debt of the group to abnormal levels. The overall performance of the 
group worsened during the 1980s, when a first re-organization attempt is tried 
under the presidency of Romano Prodi. 
 
Divestiture of some assets had been a practice at IRI since its inception, and 
contributed to the so called “breathing” of the SOE sector. However, only at the 
end of the 1980s privatization starts being considered a viable strategy to curb debt 
and to improve the performance of portfolio companies. 
 
The most important privatizations reported in this period are the partial sales in the 
telecommunications sector (Sirti and STET), Alitalia (the flagship air carrier), and 
Banca Commerciale Italiana (BCI), which all took place in 1985 through public 
offers of shares. Privatization advances during the 1980s and early 1990s with 
additional sales in the banking sector and food industry. Overall, the divestiture of 
these holdings allowed IRI to raise around US$5bn. Albeit economically important, 
this first privatization attempt was not a part of a long-term strategy, but rather a 
sequence of sporadic sales mainly intended to raise cash. 
 
3.2 The start-up stage 
 
As we mentioned above, the critical event in triggering the first large scale 
privatization wave was the promulgation on August 1992 of the law establishing 
the corporatization of public conglomerates and the immediate transfer of the 
shares to the MEF.  
 
In the following years, the government launched a sustained program of sales 
starting from the banking and insurance sector. Four primary Italian banks (Credito 
Italiano, BCI, BNL) and INA (Istituto Nazionale delle Assicurazioni), a large 
insurance company, were placed in the stock market through a sequence of issues. 
At the same time, IRI divested its entire interest in the food industry through the 
private sale of the holdings of SME (Società Meridionale di Elettricità), and 
resumed the privatization of STET. 
 
During the first wave of large scale privatizations, the government drafted the 
framework privatization law (n. 474) in 1994, establishing privatization principles 
and procedures with an explicit preference to public offers of shares rather than 
private equity placements, a method to be used only residually. 
 
New legislation and learning by doing allowed the Italian government to implement 
the major operation of the early period, i.e. the IPO of ENI at the end of 1995. From 
1992 onwards, the company was deeply restructured and transformed from a 
diversified conglomerate into an oil and gas company with a strong focus on core 
business and high growth potential. The issue was well received and raised 
US$3.9bn in domestic and international markets. Another important institutional   14
innovation occurring in 1995 was represented by the – long debated – law 
establishing Independent Regulatory Agencies (IRAs) in public utilities, slating the 




3.3 The “core” stage 
 
During 1996-2000, the Italian privatization process, not differently from the rest of 
the world, reaches its peak. Indeed, revenues raised in the period (US$70bn) 
account for two thirds of total proceeds of the country. Favorable stock market 
conditions facilitated the sale of the largest SOEs which often operated in natural 
monopolies and utilities. Privatization of natural monopolies also followed a 
substantial reforming effort on the part of the government to liberalize and regulate 
non competitive sectors in compliance with the EC regulations. 
 
Virtually all major utilities held by the MEF experienced at least a major 
privatization transaction during the period, and all the main sectors were involved. 
ENI was again chosen for a sequence of three seasoned offers, which brought to the 
coffer around US$17bn. In October 1997, after a long reorganization process of 
state-owned assets in the telecommunication sector culminating with the merger 
between IRI’s STET and Telecom Italia (TI), the resulting company was eventually 
privatized via a global offer tapping major international exchanges, involving more 
than two million individual shareholders and raising US$9.5bn. 
 
In 1997 and 1998, the privatization of the transports sector, started in 1995 with the 
private placement of Aereoporti di Roma (ADR) to a group of strategic investors, 
advances with a capital-raising issue joint with a sizeable secondary offer of shares 
of the flagship carrier Alitalia, and an additional issue of ADR. In the same years, 
the privatization of the banking sector has continued apace, with additional tranches 
of IMI, Banca di Roma (one of IRI’s bank of national interest), BNL, and Monte 
dei Paschi di Siena, confirming the strong commitment to a full divestiture of the 
state financial sector. 
 
But the most economically important privatization implemented during this wave is 
certainly the US$16bn global offer of the electricity giant ENEL, the largest IPO in 
history. Even though mainly targeted to domestic retail investors, the offer was also 
well received internationally, and featured a successful cross-listing at NYSE. In 
the same year, the country reaches the global peak in revenues also due to the sale 
of Autostrade - the state company running the national highways system - to 
strategic investors and to the public. The results of privatizations have been truly 
remarkable, as Italy boasts more than 15 percent of the total proceeds raised world-
wide in this year (Figure 5.1). 
 
Negative market conditions induced by the burst of the Information Technology 
(IT) bubble are probably responsible for the dramatic fall in privatization activity 
which is reported in year 2000. Total revenues fell to US$5bn, a tiny 20 percent of 
the preceding year, which are almost entirely ascribed to the large sale of 
Finmeccanica, the aerospace and defense conglomerate.  
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3.4 The consolidation stage 
 
The last stage of the privatization process has two main features: (i) it is much 
smaller in scale with respect to previous years; (ii) it is characterized by private 
equity placements and block transactions to institutional investors. These new 
aspects of the privatization process are obviously related and determined by the 
changed market conditions which slowed the privatization process worldwide. 
Indeed, governments do not want to sell shares in a depressed market. Furthermore, 
as Megginson (2003) notes, selling new shares of a partially privatized company at 
a price lower than the initial public offering price (often set several years before) 
would force initial investors to realize a capital loss. This is also why price 
movements due to stock overhang became so frequent during this period. 
 
This changing environment has forced the Italian government – not differently from 
other governments in Europe and abroad – to shift the privatization method from 
public offers to private sales, and when this was not possible, to tap institutional 
instead of retail investors. This reversion in the trend is clearly visible in Figure 5 in 
terms of the sharp reduction of the percentage of transactions in public equity 
markets from 2000 onwards. 
 
Among the major deals completed in this consolidation stage, some private sales in 
the electricity sector are worth mentioning. Under a new regulation of the sector 
issued on 1999, the national monopoly must reduce its market share to no more 
than 50 percent. ENEL has then spun off three generation companies (Genco), 
which have been partly acquired by large European companies such as Electricité 
de France (EDF), Endesa, and Electrabel. On July 2003, the government 
accomplished the full sale of the tobacco monopolist, ETI (Ente Tabacchi Italiano), 
through a competitive tender which assigned the company to British American 
Tobacco who placed a US$2.6bn bid. 
 
As far as public offers are concerned, the government conducted an accelerated 
bookbuilt offer (ABO)
4 in December 2002 divesting its residual stake in Telecom 
Italia, with shares eventually allocated mainly to foreign institutional investors. 
This privatization was followed in October 2003 by a bought deal (i.e. a block sale 
transaction where a limited group of investment banks are invited to submit bids) 
for 6.6 percent of capital of ENEL. The last deal has been executed when the 
domestic market was closed to minimize negative price impacts. As to future 
privatizations the more immediate sale appears the spin-off of ENELs national grid 
TERNA, maybe merged with the Italian Transmission System Operator GRTN 
(Gestore della Rete di Trasmissione Nazionale), which is still fully owned by the 
MEF. 
 
As in the majority of developed countries, the Italian state, and particularly the 
MOF, is still an influential shareholder in several privatized companies, such as 
ENI, ENEL, Finmeccanica, and Alitalia. Furthermore, it still fully owns FS, the 
railway system operator, and RAI (Radio Televisione Italiana) the television 
                                                 
4 ABO are auctions where institutional investors submit price-quantity schedules, and then the issuing 
price is set such that supply equals demand.    16
broadcasting company. Roughly, this portfolio of assets is worth US$80bn and it is 




4  Methods 
 
4.1 Privatize banks first 
 
The divestiture of the banking sector was considered a strategic element for the 
success of the large-scale privatization program. First, bank privatization coped 
with modernization and liberalization would have boosted the operational 
efficiency of the banking industry, and contributed to mobilize household savings 
into productive investment, spurring economic growth. Second, a more competitive 
banking sector would have developed investment banking and underwriting 
services to be used as inputs in the privatization of non-financial firms. Third, 
universal banks would have specialized in asset management and played a role as 
shareholders of newly privatized firms. Fourth, and more practically, starting with 
the privatization of stronger banks would be a “best foot forward” policy likely to 
attract the attention of domestic and international investors, enhance credibility, and 
revitalize the stock market. 
 
In order to garner fully the benefits of privatization, at the beginning of the 1990s 
the government launched an ambitious structural reform of the banking sector. The 
first important step in this reforming effort is represented by the so called “Amato-
Carli” law (n. 218 of July 1990). This legislation changed the legal status of savings 
banks and banks operating under public law, transforming them into limited 
liability companies. Importantly, the law provided a normative framework coped 
with a set of fiscal incentives aimed at the consolidation of the banking sector in 
order to strengthen the financial system, its international presence, and 
competitiveness. These changes were embodied in the 1993 Consolidated Banking 
Law, which also removed barriers between short and long-term credit institutions, 
enabling the creation of universal banks which could therefore be involved in the 
privatization of non-financial firms. 
 
Starting from 1993, the government launched a sustained program of privatization 
of major banks owned by IRI (Credito Italiano and BCI) and directly by the MEF 
(BNL, IMI). These sales involved the complete divestiture of the government’s 
holding via flotation in public equity markets. These (and other) listings expanded 
the weight of financial intermediaries in the Italian stock market, raising revenues 
worth 16 percent of the total. Between 1992 and 2001, the number of banks listed 
in the Milan Stock Exchange rose from 15 to 37. As of December 2001, the 
capitalization of privatized banking groups accounted for more than a half of the 
market value of listed banks (Inzerillo and Missori, 2002). 
 
Importantly, deregulation combined with sustained privatization spurred a wave of 
consolidation which dramatically changed the banking landscape in Italy. Since 
1990, there have been 566 mergers and acquisitions involving banks (accounting 
for almost 50 percent of total assets). Until 1989, the annual number of mergers   17
was around 12; they have averaged about 43 per year between 1990 and 1997. In 
the same period the total number of banks declined by about one quarter, from 
1,100 to little more than 800, despite the entry in the market of more than 200 new 
intermediaries (BNP – Paribas, 2001). This was accompanied by a steady increase 
in the market share of the five largest groups from 34 to 54 percent, in line with the 
figure for France and higher than that for Germany (see Figure 7). 
 
The three current “heavyweights” of the financial industry emerged from M&A 
activity involving privatized banks. Intesa BCI Group resulted from the merger 
between Ambrosiano Veneto and Cariplo in 1998, followed by the integration with 
Banca Commerciale Italiana in 1999. The group San Paolo-IMI originated from the 
merger between Istituto San Paolo di Torino and IRI’s IMI in 1998. The group then  
acquired a controlling stake in Banco di Napoli (16 percent) from the MEF in 2000. 
Finally, IRI’s Credito Italiano, which first acquired Credito Romagnolo in 1994, 
was then taken over by Unicredito, forming the Unicredito Italiano Group. 
 
The operating and financial performance of the banking sector, previously 
structurally weak, has improved noticeably during the 1990s. In year 2000, the 
largest institutions report a ROE around 13 percent which is in line with the 
profitability of banks in major developed countries (Table 3). Importantly, the 
quality of banks’ asset, measured by the percentage of non performing loans, has 
steadily improved starting from 1996 (Figure 8). 
 
Overall, during the 1990s the Italian banking sector experienced a true 
transformation. From a system with large state involvement, preponderance of 
domestic business, and a low level of concentration, the financial industry caught 
up quickly with international competitors by reducing costs, managing risks, and 
diversifying their services.  
 
Privatization has certainly been a major driver of these changes.  From 1992 the 
share of total assets of SOE banks fell from 74 percent to virtually nil (Table 4). 
 
 
4.2 Public offers as a strategic choice 
 
Financial market development has been one of the main objectives of the Italian 
privatization process since the beginning. Indeed, a privatization policy aimed at 
fostering stock markets can be rationalized in terms of social welfare and economic 
growth. Empirical studies have shown that market development (and particularly 
liquidity) is a robust predictor of economic growth and capital accumulation 
(Levine and Zervos, 1998; Levine, 1997). Furthermore, market liquidity provides 
incentives for information acquisition by financial analysts, making possible to 
design stock-based managerial incentive schemes, with important implications on 
firm efficiency (Hölmstrom and Tirole, 1993). Finally, both larger and more liquid 
equity markets allow improved risk sharing associated with greater investors’ 
participation (Pagano, 1993).  
 
The strategic use of privatization to foster domestic stock markets was clearly 
stated in official documents, such as the Libro verde delle partecipazioni dello 
Stato, and embodied in several legal documents defining privatization procedures.   18
For example, the n. 359 Law of 1992 entitled “Urgent measures to alleviate public 
finance conditions” states that “the program of reorganization of state holdings 
must foresee the quotation of the companies  […]”. In the same spirit, article 2 of 
the Privatization Law n. 474 of 1994 states that “the disposal of state holdings is 
implemented as a rule through a public offer of shares”, even if other privatization 
techniques - such as the private placement - could also be used under specific 
circumstances. 
 
The strong preference towards the floatation of the shares of privatized companies 
in public equity markets is clearly visible in the data. As Table 2 shows, the share 
of revenues raised by PO to total sales has been very high as compared to other 
developed countries. Importantly, from 1993 to 2000, revenues raised by PO dwarf 
those raised by private sales (Figure 5). From 2000 onwards, after the end of the big 
privatization cycle, we observe a shift towards private equity placements due to the 
equity market downturn. 
 
Obviously, public offers were not suitable for all the companies in the MEF 
portfolio. The Green Book stated clearly that this privatization method could be 
used for larger companies and for those already listed in the exchange, and 
particularly for profitable and well-managed SOEs. Companies meeting these 
stringent criteria could in principle become public companies with diffuse 
shareholders. 
 
Spreading share ownership via privatization in public equity markets was then a top 
priority of the first stage of the Italian process, with the proviso that the government 
would have fetched a fair price. In this direction, privatization had been initially 
structured as fixed-price offers of shares. More sophisticated auction based selling 
mechanisms, such as book-building exercises were to be postponed to a more 
advanced stage. 
 
The main advantage of a fixed-price offer (in combination with an underwriting 
agreement) lies in its simplicity of execution, transparency, and potential to attract 
retail investors. Nevertheless, there is a trade-off between the objective of spreading 
share ownership and revenues maximization in that shares are usually underpriced. 
However, in the initial stages of a large-scale program, the main objective is the 
success of the first issues in order to create positive expectations about future sales. 
Thus initial share prices have to be set moderately by considering that underpricing 
is not a sunk cost, but rather an investment for the successful marketing of future 
privatizations. As long as the process advances, the government should gain 
credibility overtime, increasing investors’ confidence, so undepricing can be 
reduced, and the seller can eventually shift to more competitive selling procedures. 
 
The Italian program has been implemented with this dynamic model in mind. Initial 
privatizations on public equity markets have been in the majority of cases 
implemented as fixed-price offers which have been largely oversubscribed 
especially by retail investors (see Figure 9 and Table 5). Importantly, data show 
quite clearly a steady decline in underpricing from IPO to seasoned offers. 
However price discounts appear quite limited as compared to the international 
averages, mainly based on the UK experience (Table 6), confirming the importance 




4.3 The allocation of shares  
 
The Italian government had a strong preference about the final allocation of shares 
in privatized companies, and the objective of spreading share ownership was 
paramount. However, an accurate pricing of the company shares was also needed. 
This could be achieved only by involving institutional investors. 
 
Indeed, institutional investors play a fundamental role in the success of the issues. 
First, they provide information about the value of the company, allowing a more 
accurate pricing also for the retail tranche. Second, they intervene in the after-
market to stabilize prices. This price support activity is typically performed by 
using the over-allotment option (the so-called green shoe). The green shoe is a 
clause in the underwriting agreement, saying that, in the event of excess public 
demand, the issuer will authorize additional shares for distribution by the syndicate. 
When the green shoe is foreseen, underwriters oversell the issue, allocating more 
than the total quantity of shares offered. If there is excess demand and the stock 
prices rise, the underwriter covers its short position by exercising the over-
allotment option. If instead prices fall, they close their short position by open-
market purchases. In both cases, prices are stabilized and the underwriter makes a 
profit. In the first case, it is given by the spread on the additional shares. In the 
second, it is given by the difference between the offer price and the price in the 
after-market.  
 
The trade-off between spreading share ownership and accurate pricing has been 
solved by using multiple-tranche offerings, where the shares are allocated both to 
institutional and retail investors. As Table 7 shows, multiple-tranche offerings have 
been chosen in the majority of cases. Single-tranche offerings earmarked to 
institutions are concentrated in the last privatization stage. Overall, the retail 
tranche is quite large, especially for IMI1, ENI4, and Telecom Italia (TI) 1, and it 
accounts on average for more than 50 percent of the offering. If we consider 
multiple-tranche issues only, a preferential allocation to retail market is clearly 
visible in the data. The average size of the retail tranche is around 70 percent, while 
institutions received 29 percent of the offers. 
 
A closer look at the distribution of shares within the tranches shows that domestic 
investors got the lion’s share of the retail tranche (83 percent). The government’s 
preference towards this type of investor is not only consistent with the aim to foster 
equity culture, but also with the objective of boosting domestic market liquidity. 
Indeed, a larger involvement of retail investors reduces the likelihood of 
information trading, as they have smaller holdings than financial institutions and 
hence a lower incentive to acquire costly information. The lower is the likelihood 
of dealing with a sophisticated counterpart, the smaller are anticipated losses, the 
lower is the bid-ask spread, i.e. the premium that speculators and dealers charge to 
liquidity traders, and the higher is market liquidity (Glosten and Milgrom, 1985; 
Kyle, 1985). 
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The international profile of the retail tranche is also worth noticing. Five SOEs 
(IMI, ENI, ENEL, San Paolo, and Telecom Italia) have been cross-listed in the US, 
either via a direct listing or a level III ADR (American Depository  Receipts) 
program (which entails full compliance to SEC  regulation and accounting 
standards). US public markets have been chosen for prestige but also as a signaling 
strategy for highest quality companies, which were slated to compete 
internationally. In these cases, the road show at NYSE has been considered as an 
unmatched opportunity to tell the country’s story and prospects to a large audience 
of qualified investors, which could be interested also in considering investment 
opportunities at home. Increased foreign participation in the Italian stock market 
would have reduced domestic risk premia (as a part of risk would be borne 
internationally), and liquidity. 
 
The major public offerings reported in Table 7 feature a quite limited - albeit not 
negligible - involvement of employees, which on average obtained 12 percent of 
the final allocation. On the one hand, employee ownership of privatized firms could 
facilitate the sales as a policy to “buy-out” a class of stakeholders often quite averse 
to divestiture. However, a larger involvement of employees in share capital would 
have hindered the future growth opportunities of privatized firms. Finally, and more 
practically, shareholders-employees would have badly diversified their portfolios 
by investing their human capital and savings in the same assets.  
 
Underpricing encourages stagging, with investors being able to reap abnormal 
initial returns. In order to encourage retail investors to participate in the stock 
market with a long-term view, bonus shares schemes have been introduced in all 
major sales. The typical scheme consisted in a free distribution of one share out of 
ten held for a three-year period. On average, bonus shares schemes were not 
negligible, and involved 1.5 percent of capital stock.  
 
As far as the institutional tranche is concerned, preferential allocation has been 
given to domestic institutional investors, which obtained on average 43 percent of 
shares offered, as opposed to overseas investors. The dual aim of this strategy was 
to increase the presence of domestic institutional investors in the share capital of 
firms, and also to get domestic financial intermediaries more acquainted with 
investment banking activities. However, the involvement of overseas investors is 
far from negligible, especially from the UK.  
 
 
4.4 The design of ownership structures 
 
The issue of the ownership and control structure of privatized companies ignited a 
political debate between two opposing views. On the one hand, supporters of the 
public company model stressed the role of diffuse ownership and of the market for 
corporate control. On the other hand, the proponents of the model based on hard 
core shareholders (imported from the French experience of noyaux durs) stressed 
the importance of large shareholders to monitor firms and to keep managers “on 
their toes”. Clearly, the model of the public company was more consistent with the 
long term objective of stock market development. However, as Goldstein and 
Nicoletti (2003) note, such a policy was at odds with the actual skepticism on the 
part of domestic investors towards buying shares and with the opaque nature of   21
corporate ownership and control structures of private listed firms, characterized by 
a web of cross-holdings and informal ties. 
 
The final solution in terms of privatization methods was actually a compromise 
between these two models. In order to avoid an excessive concentration of powers 
in the privatized company, the law foresaw the possibility of introducing in the 
company bylaws a 5 percent ownership limit on shareholdings. A single 
shareholder, or a group of shareholders acting in concert through a voting syndicate, 
owning more than 5 percent of capital was forbidden to exercise the voting rights in 
excess of that limit. Furthermore, these statutory constraints could not be modified 
for a period of three years but did not apply in case of a takeover bid. The rights of 
minority shareholders were also enhanced by introducing special voting 
mechanisms (voto di lista) for directors in the companies where ownership limits 
were present. Particularly, shareholders representing at least 1 percent of voting 
capital were allowed to present their list of board candidates, and at least one fifth 
of the board members had to be reserved to the election via minority lists. 
 
On the other hand, in order to favor some degree of ownership concentration, the 
law set forth that some shares could be directly sold to a core group of stable 
shareholders in combination with lock-up provisions and specific undertakings in 
terms of management. 
 
Overall, explicit preference was given to the public offer of shares, aiming at 
spreading share ownership. The direct sale of the shares to a group of strategic 
shareholders occurred mainly in smaller scale operations managed by the IRI group. 
A core of stable shareholders has been established jointly with the share issue in the 
stock market only in quite a few cases, the prominent one being Telecom Italia. In 
October 1998, the government launched the global offer together with an equity 
placement to a large group of financial institutions, owning 6.7 percent of total 
capital with a three years lock-up clause. Similarly, stable shareholders have been 
identified in the sale of Banco di Roma, one of IRI’s banks of national interests, 
Banca Nazionale del Lavoro (ending up with Banco Bilbao e Vizcaya, INA, and 




4.5 The special powers of the state 
 
One of the main objectives of privatization is to enhance the efficiency of SOEs. 
The transfer of ownership and control from the state to the private sector improves 
economic performance as shareholders and managers have a direct stake in the 
maximization of the value of the firms. The incentives to create value are larger the 
more the privatized companies are exposed to competition in the product market 
and to the risk of hostile takeovers by domestic and institutional investors. 
 
In some circumstances, the objective of value maximization may conflict with other 
industrial policy considerations, such as the need to maintain public control in some 
sectors which are deemed strategic for the national economy, or in newly privatized 
companies. In the first case, the rationale is the protection of relevant public   22
interests in sectors such as energy, utilities, aerospace, national airlines, etc.;
5 in the 
second case, the opportunity to afford the company a limited time to adjust to the 
market.  
 
The state can preserve the privatized company under control by holding the 
majority of stock. Alternatively, it can grant itself special powers which may allow 
to control the company even without being a large shareholder. This set of powers 
may stem from the possession of a redeemable special share, from limitations 
imposed by the privatized company’s statutes and from the possession of special 
class shares. 
 
The Italian government – following a quite common practice in developed 
economies - granted itself wide discretionary powers over partially or even fully 
privatized companies by introducing an ad hoc legislation, embedded in the 
consolidated privatization law, concerning the special powers of the state (the so-
called golden shares). By exerting its rights, the “special” shareholder can influence 
the choice of management, exert veto power over the acquisition of relevant stakes 
by private shareholders, even without owning the majority of stock in the company, 
or a single share of capital (Bortolotti and Siniscalco, 2004) 
 
Golden shares have been introduced in accordance with the 1994 privatization law 
in the company bylaws of four companies (ENI, ENEL, Telecom Italia and 
Finmeccanica, the aerospace and defense conglomerate) and have similar content, 
which can be summarized as follows: 
 
•  MEF approval is required for a material acquisition of shares representing 3 
percent or more of the share capital, or voting share capital. Voting rights 
are reduced correspondingly to 3 percent, but this restriction does not apply 
to any shareholding held by Italian state, public entities, or other entities 
controlled by the state or by other public entities. 
 
•  The MEF appoints one member of the board of directors and one of the 
board of statutory auditors, in addition to the members appointed in its 
capacity of shareholder. Directors appointed by the Ministry may be private 
individuals and public officials, who are fully responsible according to the 
provisions governing liability of the Italian civil code. The remuneration for 
sitting in boards is included in the public official’s compensation package. 
A part of the fee is allocated to a special fund which is used to cover 
                                                 
5 This was the rationale for the special shares in the United Kingdom. The British government took 
stock of the experience of the privatization of British Petroleum (BP), the national oil monopoly and 
by far Britain's largest company. BP was privatized without any golden share through a series of issues 
from 1977 to October 1987, when the government came to sell its remaining 31.5 percent shareholding. 
By early 1988, the Kuwait Investment Office (KIO) began building up a stake in BP which in a few 
months amounted to 21.7 percent of the company's share capital. The possibility that a foreign public 
shareholder would control the company raised alarms in the English establishment and in the political 
debate, also because huge BP assets in Kuwait were previously nationalized. After an investigation by 
the UK's Monopolies and Mergers Commission, the government endorsed the Commission's findings 
that the KIO's holding could operate against the public interest. The KIO was therefore required to 
reduce its stake to not more than 9.9 percent of BP's stock. In 1989, BP purchased (and then cancelled) 
790 million BP shares from the KIO, at three times the issue price.   23
professional insurance. Another part is transferred to the Presidency of the 
Council of the Ministers. 
 
•  The MEF may exercise the veto power over major changes such as the 
dissolution of the company, its transfer, merge or de-merger, the transfer of 
the headquarters outside Italy, the change of corporate purposes, the 
amendment or modification of any of the special powers.  
 
In the case of Finmeccanica, the special share grants to the government the right to 
appoint from 1 to the maximum of one fourth of board members, and extend the 
veto rights to the sale of a business or line of business, including the transfer of 
equity participation in subsidiaries or affiliates.  
 
Importantly, Italy did not impose any temporal limit on the special powers. As far 
as ENEL is concerned, a verification period of five years (in 2005) is foreseen. As 
for Telecom Italia, the special powers were to be maintained for a period of three 
years from privatization or till the complete liberalization of the telecommunication 
sector, but they are still currently operational. 
 
The Italian government during these years has exercised its powers by appointing 
representatives in the Boards, without blocking takeovers or the acquisition of 
relevant interest in privatized companies. However, the European Commission took 
legal steps against Italy and other member states as golden shares schemes have 
raised excessive barriers against the free movement of capital, one of the basic 
principles stated in the Treaty of Rome founding the European Union. In 2003 the 
Italian government has therefore amended the 1994 legislation by establishing 
clearer procedures for the exercise of rights.  
 
 
5  The legislative and institutional framework for privatization 
 
As mentioned above, the definition of a clear legal and institutional framework has 
been one of the key elements of a long term strategy aimed at implementing an 
ambitious privatization process. Major institutional innovations were needed to 
allow the transformation of a system characterized by a large presence of the state 
in all areas of economic activity into a market-friendly economy strongly based on 
a robust financial system. During the 1990s, Italy pursued a consistent policy in that 
direction, by implementing a series of reforms which have been key for the success 
of such an ambitious structural change.   
 
The areas of reform can be subdivided into four (main) categories. First, suitable 
legislation has been enacted to corporatize SOEs, i.e. to transform bodies of the 
public administration into companies limited by shares. Second, clear rules, 
guidelines, and procedures have been established to regulate the practical 
implementation of privatization sales. Third, de novo regulatory institutions and 
principles have been created to avoid distortions in non-competitive sectors and 
network industries. Fourth, new rules have been set to improve corporate 
governance and the efficiency of the financial system. In what follows, we will 
briefly sketch the relevant legislations in all these areas.    24
 
 
5.1 Corporatization and reorganization of the SOE sector 
 
The first formal legislation aimed at transforming the legal status of SOEs is Law 
218 of July 1990 ("Amato-Carli Law") which involved state-owned banks. The 
objective of the law was not only the corporatization but also fostering the 
consolidation of the banking industry via M&A. This law allowed to change the 
legal status of the public banks from public entities to companies limited by shares; 
this was achieved in most cases by splitting the original entity into a “foundation” 
and a commercial company, the latter being 100 per cent owned by the former.  
 
Entities owning joint-stock corporations were allowed to sell up to 49 percent to 
private shareholders. With the exception of the three IRI banks of national interest 
and a few other cases where the central government owned shares (where shares 
were directly transferred to the MEF), ownership of the public banks was attributed 
to the newly created foundations, whose nature is still the subject of debate and of 
legal controversy: formally they are self-governed non-profit entities, entrusted 
with a capital whose proceeds can be used to fund projects of their own choice, 
within a range of public-interest activities, such as research, hospitals, cultural 
events, etc., stated in the law. Although the bank foundations are still unable to vest 
themselves with a well-defined juridical structure within the sphere of law, a 
facilitating tax regulation enables them to receive a significant fiscal benefit on the 
taxation of dividends from the so-called “contributing bank”. The 1993 amendment 
of the law also provided tax incentives to encourage domestic and international 
mergers lasting up to five years from the closing date.  
 
Another key legal document concerning the corporatization of SOEs is Law 359 of 
August 1992. This law transformed IRI, ENI, INA, and ENEL into joint-stock 
companies, also setting the criteria for the identification of the company’s net worth. 
By law, shares of newly incorporated SOEs, along with the shares of BNL, IMI and 
Cassa Depositi e Prestiti, are transferred to the MEF, that will exert the shareholder 
rights on behalf of the President of the Council of Ministers (Head of Government) 
and in co-ordination with the Ministry of Budget and Planning and the Ministry of 
Industry.  
 
The law also charged the MEF to draft within three months a re-organization 
program of the state holdings in the above mentioned SOEs, possibly finalized to 
eventual divestiture, transfer or exchange of shares, mergers and acquisitions. The 
program should consider the stock exchange listing of the companies resulting from 
the re-organization and the allocation of the revenues to reduce public debt. 
 
Law 33 of February 1993 liquidated the financially distressed public conglomerate 
EFIM, with most of the assets in the  manufacturing industry. Within 1992, the 
liquidation committee was charged to present to the MEF a plan concerning the 
companies formerly controlled by EFIM and their subsidiaries, indicating which 
portfolio companies, or parts of their business, could be transferred to third parties, 
and which instead were not in a condition to be transferred (indicating the adequate 
procedures for their liquidation) along with a three-year re-organization plan for 
steel mills. The program had also to indicate the timing and sequence of operations   25
aimed at the rationalization of the business (mergers, refinancing, recapitalization, 
new incorporations, etc.), their impact on the work-force and the expected results.  
 
Finally, Law 202 of June 1993 suppressed the Ministry of State Holdings as of 
February 22, 1993 and transferred the corresponding shareholder rights to the MEF. 
 
 
5.2 Privatization procedures 
 
The rules for the sale of state holdings have been initially established in two official 
decisions by the Inter-ministerial Committee for Economic Planning (CIPE) and 
then embodied in the consolidated text of the privatization law (Law n. 474 of July 
1994). 
 
The two CIPE decisions set the first rules about the possible privatization methods, 
public offers, auctions, and private placements and also established the principles 
for the determination of value and for the selection of advisors, and global 
coordinators. Importantly, the law stated explicitly the objective of spreading share 
ownership via underpriced fixed price public offers, preferential allocation of 
shares to small shareholders, and bonus shares. The possibility of hard-core 
shareholders was also considered, along with the allocation of special powers to the 
state. In order to provide transparency and adopt international best practices, a 
special Committee (Comitato Permanente di Consulenza Globale e di Garanzia) – 
composed by the General Director of the Treasury and four independent experts -
was set up to establish the calendar of sales, to advise on the most suitable 
privatization methods, and to ensure transparency in the selection process of 
advisors and underwriters. 
 
Law n. 474 of July 1994 is often mentioned as the keynote legal document on 
privatization. This law reiterates the preference to public offers of shares, allowing 
also the possibility - under well specified conditions of a private placement of 
shares - to a group of stable shareholders. It subordinates the privatization of 
utilities to the establishment of independent agencies charged to regulate tariffs and 
the quality of public services. It allows the possibility to introduce in the company 
bylaws of privatized companies operating in defense, transports, 
telecommunications, energy and other utilities a clause affording the special powers 
to the state described in section 4.5. The exact wording of the clause is established 
by a decree of the MEF, acting in concert with the Ministry of Industry. Similarly, 
the law allows the introduction in the company bylaws of an ownership limit up to 
5 percent of capital for any single shareholder or a group of shareholders acting 
through a voting syndicate. Such a limit is not binding in case of a takeover bid for 
the majority of votes. In companies where such a limit is present, the law allows to 
enhance the representation of minority shareholders (owning at least 1 percent of 
capital) in the Board of Directors via special voting mechanisms (voto di lista). 
Finally, if legal or effective control is exerted on a company privatized by public 
offer, the law forces the disclosure of voting agreements and the launch of partial 
take-over bids. 
 
A top priority of the Italian privatization process was improving public finance 
conditions and particularly curbing public debt. In this direction, the government   26
regulated the allocation of privatization proceeds by establishing the debt 
amortization fund (Fondo per l'ammortamento dei titoli di Stato). Following 
European Commission provisions and Eurostat principles preventing the direct use 
of privatization revenues to cover fiscal imbalances, Law 432 of October 1993 
established that privatization revenues and SOE dividends had to be allocated to the 
fund in order to buy back outstanding Treasury bonds. During the 1994-2001 
period, US$122bn have been allocated to the fund, allowing a sharp reduction of 




5.3 Utility regulation  
 
Before the large-scale privatization process started, the boundary between the state 
as owner of companies and as regulator  remained  blurry. Special concessions 
were typically granted to SOEs, which were also directly or indirectly involved in 
the regulation of public services. Authority over tariffs was given to a special 
government committee (Comitato Interministeriale Prezzi, CIP), but often some 
SOE managers were seconded at CIP to advise on the prices of their respective 
sector of activity. Responsibility over regulatory issues was therefore extremely 
dispersed among different ministries and layers of the public administration. As a 
consequence, SOE enjoyed a strong monopoly power and public services were in 
general provided quite inefficiently. 
 
The decision to privatize unavoidably forces major changes in the regulatory 
regime. Particularly, successful privatization sales need a clear-cut separation of the 
dual role of the state, curbing possible conflict of interests. Indeed, the government 
may warrant the company ex ante a favorable regulatory environment to facilitate 
the sale and maximize revenues, and then expropriate the company profits by 
taxation or by an unexpected review of the regulation. The new regulatory 
environment must look credible at the eyes of domestic and institutional investors 
and signal government’s commitment to market-friendly reforms. Furthermore, it 
has been shown that privatization entails a trade-off between allocative and 
productive efficiency: due to improved incentives, privatized SOEs tend to deliver 
goods and services more efficiently, but informational problems make it more 
difficult to force them to pursue social goals. As a consequence, regulation has to 
be carefully designed in order to avoid distortions and correct market failures. 
 
During the 1990s, Italy has  significantly changed its regulatory environment in 
order to fully garner the benefits of privatization. The first important step in this 
direction has been the establishment of Independent Regulatory Agencies (IRAs) of 
the utility sector with the Law 281 of 1995. Aim of the law was to promote 
competition and efficiency in the utility sector (electricity, gas and 
telecommunications), by setting a transparent and certain tariff system which could 
balance the interests of final customers and operating companies. Importantly, the 
law states that IRAs must operate under fully autonomy and independence. In order 
to ensure independence from the executive, the law establishes each Agency to be 
composed of a president and two voting members appointed by the President of the 
Republic, conditional on the positive judgement of competent parliamentary 
commissions. IRAs areas of activity are very wide. They regulate market access,   27
define universal service obligation, regulate concessions and access to essential 
facilities such as networks, playing also a quasi-jurisdictional role in identifying 
infringements and possible misbehavior on the part of regulated companies. 
 
In the telecommunication sector, the establishment of the IRA has been followed by 
a series of decisions aimed at tearing down several institutional barriers both in the 
fixed line and mobile telephony. Telecom Italia still owns the largest market share, 
but it is continuing to shrink especially in the long-distance market. The mobile 
sector is one of the largest in Europe, the highest in terms of penetration rate, and 
one of the most competitive, with 4 GSM operators and five 3G licenses awarded in 
2000, one of which already operational in 2002. As of 2003, prices in fixed 
telephony dropped by 30 percent from 1998, the official date of the implementation 
of the EU liberalization directive. 
 
The electricity sector has also been deeply restructured. The framework legislation 
in the liberalization of the sector is Legislative Decree 79 of 1999 (the so-called 
Bersani Decree). The law, implementing the corresponding EU liberalization 
directive, establishes that as of January 1 2003, any single firm will not be allowed 
to produce or import more than 50 percent of electricity produced or imported in 
Italy. In compliance with these new legislations, the government has spun-off three 
generating companies worth 15,000 MW of installed capacity. Furthermore, the law, 
in order to foster transparency and curb cross-subsidies, imposed the accounting 
separation of generation, transmission and distribution. The law also established the 
role and responsibilities of the transmission system operator (TSO), which has been 
incorporated and attributed to the MEF, and of the electricity market operator, 
which would be operational at a more advanced stage of the liberalization process 
should a sufficient degree of competition develop on both sides of the market. 
Despite the new regulatory environment, the competitive structure of the Italian 
market is still heavily concentrated, with ENEL enjoying a dominant position (60 
percent of generating capacity as of 2002). As a consequence, final consumers did 
not experience the beneficial effect of liberalization and privatization especially due 
to the scant entry of new operators in the market. To foster investment, in 2002 the 
Ministry of Industry has promulgated a decree to speed-up the authorization for 
plants with a generating capacity larger than 300 MW.  
 
The natural gas market has been more heavily liberalized. In implementing the EU 
directive with Legislative Decree 164 of 2000, the government established that any 
single company could not enjoy a market share larger than 50 percent and not inject 
more than 75 percent of the gas transported through the transmission pipelines. The 
law also established the corporate and accounting separation of storage, transport, 
and commercial activities. This new set of laws slated the IPO of the gas 
transmission grid, Snam Rete Gas, which was fully owned by the ENI group.  
 
 
5.4 Corporate governance 
 
As we have seen, the Italian privatization process has been designed to spread 
ownership diffusion in listed companies. This policy was aimed at creating a new 
class of stakeholders, namely minority investors, that had a very limited presence in 
the domestic stock market. In order to sustain their demand for stocks of privatized   28
companies but also of private companies, corporate governance systems should 
have been deeply improved. 
 
With the enactment of the Consolidated Law on Finance (Legislative Decree 58 of 
February 1998, the so-called “Draghi law”), major changes have been introduced 
into Italian corporate law. The Draghi Law aims at consolidating the legal 
foundations of the financial market, getting closer to the corporate governance 
standards of more advanced capitalist economies. The law rationalized a very 
complex corpus of rules arising from the stratification of various legislations by 
substituting more than 30 laws with a single consolidated text.  
 
The new law filled the gaps in the Italian regulation of financial intermediation and 
introduced modern, flexible and, to some extent, innovative rules concerning 
financial markets, securities dealing and investment services, insider trading, 
disclosure and price manipulation, corporate governance and the rights of minority 
shareholders, and takeovers. The rationale of the law was to ensure a suitable level 
of stability and integrity in the operation of financial markets, while leaving 
competitive forces free to shape the industry. In this direction, the regulatory 
approach was mainly based on the statement of general principles and imposition of 
minimum standards, charging the supervisory authorities, particularly the Security 
Regulatory Commission (CONSOB – Commissione Nazionale per le Società e la 
Borsa), to specify detailed rules in secondary legislation. 
 
The main innovations embodied in the “Draghi law” cover three areas: i) 
transparency and disclosure of information; ii) protection of minority shareholders; 
iii) contestability of control and tender offers. 
 
As to transparency and disclosure, issuers offering securities to the public are 
obliged by law to publish a prospectus containing the information needed to 
investors in order to make an informed assessment of the issuer’s financial position 
and of the financial product and related rights. The law foresees that the CONSOB 
shall issue a regulation providing the guidelines for drafting prospectuses and for 
updating the reported information. CONSOB is also charged to set down codes of 
best practice to be adopted by the issuers of financial products. Furthermore, the 
law establishes that listed companies are forced to disclose information on 
shareholders’ agreements and on events that, if made public, would be likely to 
have significant effect on the price of the listed financial instruments. Importantly, 
the law also empowers CONSOB to monitor the accuracy of information provided 
to the public by listed issuers.     
 
Legal protection of minority investors is also significantly enhanced. First, the 
threshold needed to call an extraordinary meeting is reduced from 20 to 10 percent 
of share capital, or to a lower percentage established in the company bylaws. 
Second, shareholders are allowed to cast their vote by mail. Third, shareholders 
representing at least 5 percent of share capital are granted the right to bring 
derivative suits against directors, members of the auditing board, or general 
managers and to file a complaint to the court for serious irregularities by directors 
and members of the auditing board. 
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Major changes also involve takeover legislation. The new set of rules is inspired by 
two main principles. First, the protection of minority shareholders, who should be 
granted the right to exit from their investments at conditions similar to those 
prevailing before the bid, but also the – related – right to receive a part of the 
control premium. Second, the need to facilitate the transfer of control. 
 
After a long debate, the solution adopted consisted in a mandatory bid for all the 
ordinary shares by any person who, as a result of purchase for a consideration, 
comes to own a shareholding exceeding 30 percent. The offer shall be made within 
thirty days at a price not lower than the arithmetic mean of the weighted average 
market price in the last twelve months and the highest price agreed upon in the 
same period by the bidder for the purchase of ordinary shares. 
 
Overall, the Draghi law has certainly improved corporate governance and 
especially the legal protection afforded to minority investors, fostering institutional 
investors’ activism, market monitoring, disclosure, and the contestability of control. 
These improvements in corporate governance are clearly visible in the data. Indeed, 
the reform caused a three-notch increase in the La Porta et al. (1999) shareholders’ 
right index, ranging from 0 to 6 to take into account the presence of the following 
rights: (i) cumulative vote for directors: (ii) proxy by mail; (iii) derivative suit; (iv) 
compulsory deposit of the shares before shareholders’ meeting; (v) a 10 percent 
ownership to call an extraordinary shareholders’ meeting; (vi) pre-emption rights 
on new issues. As Table 8 shows, this legal transplant has changed the score for 
Italy from 1 to 4, a value close to the common law average and well above the 
French civil law average, the legal origin to which Italy belongs.    
 
 
5.5 Securities market regulation 
 
In the early 1990s, the Italian stock market was underdeveloped as compared to 
other industrialized countries. As Majnoni and Massa (1996) note, the main 
contributory factors have been the inefficiency of market microstructure, a set of 
disincentives to share issuing by firms, and structurally weak demand. As we 
mentioned before, the privatization process has partly contributed to solve the last 
problem, by stimulating demand providing new investment opportunities. This 
policy has been useful to jump-start the stock market and break the initial liquidity 
trap, in combination with a series of institutional innovations which have 
substantially improved the efficiency of trading mechanisms. 
 
The set of reforms of the Italian stock exchange implemented during the 1990s 
have deeply modernized its trading and settlement systems. The most important 
provisions are contained in the 1991 Securities Market Reform Law, making on-
exchange trading compulsory starting from 1992 and introduced new specialized 
intermediaries, namely security firms. On the one hand, the ban on OTC  trading 
expanded the market substantially and curbed the order-flow migration to London 
SEAQ, which was able to attract the trading of main Italian stocks thanks to its 
more efficient trading platform. On the other hand, the new regulation on security 
firms imposed a new set of disclosure requirements improving transparency 
(Majnoni and Massa, 1996). 
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The trading and settlement system has also been deeply revised, with a gradual 
transition from an open outcry to a continuous screen-based system, completed in 
1994, and with the 1992 exemption from on-exchange trading for blocks, and with 
the complete unification of regional markets in the national screen based system. 
Finally, cash settlement was introduced in 1994 and progressively extended to a 
large number of stocks.   
 
 
6  Assessment of privatization’s impact on stock market development  
 
During the 1990s, Italy accomplished an ambitious program of transformation and 
structural reform of its financial system. The sustained privatization policy 
implemented throughout the period has been a fundamental part of this radical 
change. At the beginning of the 1990s, the financial system was channeling a 
disproportionate amount of households savings to the state sector via Treasury 
bonds. These savings were allocated to inefficient SOEs or reinvested in the private 
sector via state-owned financial intermediaries. From 1992 onwards, under the 
pressure of the European Union, the governments started to design a coherent set of 
policies aimed at creating a new system to mobilize savings into productive 
investment. The (cheap) supply of shares of profitable SOEs offered new 
investment opportunities to domestic investors, which gradually reallocated their 
portfolios towards equity investment. The consequent decline in interest rates had 
started to deflate the growth rates of public debt and contributed to boost domestic 
stock prices, facilitating the progress of the privatization process. The new equity 
culture spread among domestic investors would have created a demand for more 
sophisticated financial services, which could be offered by the domestic banking 
system, immediately slated for privatization, and by foreign financial intermediaries. 
This virtuous circle, triggered by privatization and sustained by structural reform, 
would have catalyzed the development of fully fledged market economy strongly 
based on the financial system. 
 
Overall, this ambitious program has been accomplished. Several challenges are still 
to be met. However, undoubtedly the Italian financial system experienced a true 
metamorphosis, that we try to document below. 
 
 
  6.1 Market size and liquidity 
 
As of end 2000, Italy’s stock market capitalization was close to US$800bn; then it 
rapidly started to decline reaching US500bn in 2002. From 1990 to 2002, despite 
the downturn caused in part by the burst of the IT bubble and by the global 
recession, it grew by over three times both in nominal value and as a percentage of 
GDP (see Figure 10). During the same period, the number of listed companies 
increased by 34 percent (Figure 11). The large difference in growth rates in these 
two measures of market size suggests that larger companies went public during the 
period.  
 
The data on market activity, measured by the total value of trades and by the 
conventional turnover ratio (i.e. the total trading value scaled by market   31
capitalization) are even more striking. The volume of trades increases more than 15 
times over the period, and the turnover ratio reached 133 per cent from an initial 
level of 28 (Figure 12). 
 
It would not be correct to ascribe the sheer increase in these financial development 
indicators to privatization only, given that the decline in interest rates, the 
stabilization of the currency, financial liberalization and integration also played a 
role. However, the contribution of privatized companies to the market capitalization 
and volume of trades is remarkable. At the end of the period, privatized firms 
accounted for 41 percent of total market capitalization, and 33 percent of the total 
volume of trades (see Figure 13 and 14). Importantly, companies privatized by 
public offer have a great bearing in terms of the free float. As of 2000, they account 
for 60 percent of the total floating capitalization, with a marked increase from 1996 
(14 percent) (Mediobanca, 2000).  
 
These aggregate data are quite impressive also as compared to other industrialized 
countries. As Table 9 shows, the relative contribution of privatized companies on 
market size and trading activity in Italy is well above the OECD average. 
Unfortunately, the available data do not allow a systematic comparison about the 
free float. However, anecdotal evidence suggests that Italy ranks in prominent 
position also as far as this important variable is concerned. 
 
The large scale IPOs and secondary offerings which occurred in the mid 1990s 
have jump-started the domestic stock market. However, the mechanic contribution 
of privatization to capitalization and trading activity is less important than its 
potential impact on liquidity, the real metric for the quality of a stock market.  In a 
liquid market, buy and sell orders are quickly filled and the price impact of trading 
is small. Several theories in finance have shown that a sustained privatization 
policy may have first order effects on liquidity due to improved diversification 
opportunities offered to domestic and international investors, which in turn reduce 
risk premium and the price impact. 
 
Data on the evolution of the price impact in Italy, given by the (daily) absolute 
return of the index scaled by the turnover ratio, suggest that overall market liquidity 
has significantly improved overtime while the privatization program was in 
progress, providing additional support to the cross-country evidence on the positive 
effect of share issue privatization in domestic financial market development (see 





6.2 The equity shift 
 
The supply of shares of privatized companies has radically changed the investor 
base in Italy and contributed to the equity shift in domestic portfolios.  
 
The data on the evolution of shareholdings by investor type confirm that in absolute 
value the largest reallocation involved households and foreign investors (see Table 
10). The value of direct household investment in equity increased by more than   32
seven times, and reached 29 percent of the total in 2000. However, a proper account 
of the equity shift should include also households’ indirect equity investments in 
mutual funds. With this correction, as of end 2000 the percentage of total equity 
held by households rises to 41 percent, with a 12 percent point increase from 1992.  
 
Data on equity investment by foreigners are also striking. Foreign investments 
increased by 15 times, and are worth around 15 percent of the total in 2000. In 
relative terms, the largest variation is observed in holdings by companies and 
families as large shareholders, suggesting that the privatization process also 
contributed to reduce ownership concentration. 
 
Figure 16 provides additional information about the sheer size of the equity shift in 
Italy. The spreading of equity culture stimulated domestic investors’ appetite also 
of foreign securities. In 2000, total household investment abroad was worth 1,023 
trillion Liras, and increased more than six times from 1992. Improved 
diversification in domestic portfolio had probably reduced risk premia at home, 
contributing to boost stock prices and liquidity. 
 
These data clearly show that during the 1990s Italian households substantially 
increased their participation in the stock market. However, this new trend could be 
ascribed to higher growth rates of income and savings. The data on the evolution of 
public debt by investor category from 1992 to 2000 illustrate very clearly that a 
massive reallocation from government-backed securities to equity took place at the 
household level during the 1990s (Table 11). Indeed, investment in public debt by 
households exhibits the highest variation, shrinking its share by almost 40 percent.  
 
The gap caused by equity shift by domestic households has been filled by foreign 
investors, which increased their investment in Italian sovereign debt by a sheer 36 
percent. As of end 2000, foreign investors hold 42 percent of outstanding debt. If 
equity investment is also considered, foreign investment in Italian securities is 
worth approximately 1.1 trillion Liras in 2000, around 30 percent of the total. 
 
To summarize, the Italian equity shift has been triggered by share issue 
privatization, financed by households and retail investors, and backed by foreign 
institutions. Foreign investors are actually key players in the Italian financial 
system. On the one hand, Italy has in large part lost sovereignty over the debt and 
created a mechanism of international surveillance over economic policy. On the 
other hand, foreign investment in firms has contributed to accelerate the 
transformation of the SOE sector, to foster the spreading of the equity culture, and 
to import better corporate governance systems. 
 
 
6.3 Institutional investors 
 
As shown above, share issue privatization in Italy has been intentionally designed 
to diffuse share ownership through underpriced fixed-price offerings and bonus 
shares. Retail investors – lured by potential capital gains – entered into the stock 
market for the first time and massively invested in these stocks. This new entry has 
been important because households started to get acquainted with equity investment, 
and progressively demanded more sophisticated financial services to insure better   33
diversification of their portfolios. This demand coupled with new investment 
opportunities in privatized SOEs fostered the development of institutional investors, 
especially open-end mutual funds which have been increasing their operating 
activity throughout the 1990s. 
 
Table 12 shows the evolution of asset management by institutional investors. 
During the 1990s, institutional investors gained a prominent position in the Italian 
financial system. From 1990 to 2002, the percentage of household financial savings 
managed by institutional investors rose from 11 to 40 percent, with a large part of 
the gain to be ascribed to the expansion of (open-end) mutual funds, accounting in 
2002 for almost 50 percent of the total assets managed, and 20 percent of household 
savings. Individual portfolio managers and insurance companies also substantially 
increased their share from 3 to 16 percent and from 2 to 9 percent, respectively. On 
the contrary, pension funds continue to play a marginal role in asset management, 
with a slightly declining share over the period considered. A look at the time series 
variation in the data confirm the presence of a steadily increasing trend, with a large 
fraction of the leap gained in the 1999-2000 period, and with a slight decrease in 
the share of household savings managed by mutual funds after the 2001 economic 
downturn. 
 
Italian institutional investors have been able to catch up with respect to other main 
Continental European countries, with the exception of the US. Interestingly, the 
share of household savings invested in mutual funds is very large, and similar to US 
figures. On the contrary, Italy, as many other European countries operating a pay-
as-you-go system, lags behind the US in the share managed by pension funds 
(Assogestioni, 2002).  
 
The share of equity investment by Italian funds is in line with other major 
Continental countries, even if investment in fixed-income securities is still largely 
predominant (Figure 17). Although limited in absolute value, the presence of 
institutional investors in the stock market is certainly non negligible. As of 1999, 
mutual funds investment in equity was worth approximately one third of the market, 
a share which remained quite stable in recent years despite negative market 
conditions. 
 
The mutual fund industry has experienced a strong consolidation process in recent 
years, ending up with 3 major financial groups enjoying a 50 percent market share 
(Table 13). Overall, the evolution of the industry followed the parallel 
reorganization process involving privatized banks, aiming at creating synergies 
among business lines and developing economies of scale through M&A. Indeed, 
the top three major mutual funds are managed by the three largest Italian banks 
(Table 14 ). 
 
The strong presence of institutional investors in the Italian stock markets raises the 
issue of investor activism in portfolio companies, i.e. whether mutual funds have 
played a role in promoting corporate governance. Bianchi and Enriques (2000) 
analyze the holdings by domestic and foreign mutual funds in portfolio companies 
and conclude that institutional investors have stakes large enough to play an active 
role. As of 1998, the authors document the presence of 292 relevant (i.e. larger than 
1 percent) shareholdings concerning 119 listed companies out of a total of 218,   34
heavily concentrated in the hands of 5 large management companies. Effective 
investor activism could be curbed by possible conflict of interests stemming from 
the dominance of the mutual fund industry by the major banking groups and by the 
high ownership concentration in listed companies. However, these obstacles to 
investor activism should be circumvented by foreign management companies, 
whose presence is growing rapidly in the Italian landscape.  
 




The Italian experience is certainly a success story about the possible role of 
privatization in stock market development. Indeed, the financial landscape has 
changed dramatically during the 1990s, while a program of SOE divestiture of 
unprecedented scale in Continental Europe was being implemented. It would not be 
correct to ascribe this radical change entirely to share issue privatization as 
exogenous factors such as technological advances and global financial market 
integration played a role. However, it is quite difficult to prove that the reallocation 
of household portfolios from government-backed securities to more innovative 
financial instruments, the modernization of financial intermediation, the entry of 
institutional and foreign investors, and finally the improvements in corporate 
governance systems would not have occurred without such a sustained privatization 
policy.  
 
Obviously, there are also dark spots in the process. First, privatization did not 
dramatically alter the ownership structures of listed firms, which remain more 
concentrated with respect to the Anglo-Saxon pattern. Second, the privatization 
process has not always been combined with suitable liberalization efforts and 
former public monopolies still enjoy market power. Finally, a weak pension reform 
did not create strong incentives to develop a fully-funded pension system. Thus  the 
role of pension funds – both in terms of household savings and corporate 
governance in firms - is still marginal. 
 
Although several objectives have not been accomplished yet, some lessons could be 
drawn from the Italian experience in advising strategies for privatization and capital 
market development in the PRC. 
 
Obviously, historical specifics matter, thus caution is due in the evaluation of the 
effects of a similar policy in a very different socio-economic context. Italy at the 
beginning of the 1990s was certainly a different animal with respect to today’s 
China. However, the initial conditions of the Italian financial system were not too 
distant from China’s: abundant households savings, a disproportionate amount of 
investment in government securities, a small and illiquid stock market, a large 
involvement of the State in the ownership of banks and productive assets. 
 
While similarities can be found at the micro-economic level, stark differences can 
be found in the macro-economic outlook. As we have seen in section 1, Italy 
launched its first large-scale privatization process on the verge of the financial 
collapse. Economic growth was very slow (negative in 1993), fiscal conditions   35
were rapidly deteriorating with a sky-rocketing public debt, international reserves 
slumping due to the speculative attacks, and the political system experiencing one 
of the most acute crises of the post-war period. 
 
The outlook of the Chinese economy is indeed much better than Italy’s economy of 
the 1990s. PRC is therefore in the ideal position to design a transfer policy of  
State-owned assets with a long term view, taking stock of more than twenty years 
of international experience, both in developed and emerging economies.  
 
Even if macro-economic conditions are good, new demographic trends and an 
ageing population will make the current pension system very costly and 
unsustainable in the long run. PRC has recently implemented a pension reform 
introducing a unified three-tier pension system. However, the pension system is de 
facto running as a PAYG pension scheme, with local governments borrowing from 
the individual accounts to finance the unfunded liabilities of the PAYG. As a 
consequence, a fully-funded pension system will not develop until the local 
administrations will not stop borrowing from the second pillar. When this happens, 
central governments will have to increase transfers from the national budget to 
finance pension liabilities, leading to increasing fiscal deficit and a possible 
deterioration of public finance conditions (Kim, Ho, St Giles 2003). 
 
The Italian experience has clearly shown that worsening fiscal conditions and 
mounting public debt have been main drivers of the decision to sell the shares of 
SOEs. If privatization revenues accrue to the central government, they can be 
allocated to alleviate the budget or to reduce the public debt. In the case of PRC, a 
portion of revenues could be used temporarily to finance pension liabilities until the 
three-tier pension system consolidates. The shares offered to the market would also 
represent viable investment opportunities for pension funds, which could invest 
individual accounts savings in the capital of SOEs. Finally, a part of SOE assets 
could be used to capitalize the National Social Security Fund (NSSF), which could 
be transformed into an active institutional investor. 
 
A transfer of State assets is therefore likely to occur in PRC in the medium term for 
budgetary reasons. However, the Italian case has shown that privatizations are not 
only a fiscal policy option but also an unmatched opportunity to foster capital 
market development, and PRC has strong reasons to pursue that policy. First, a 
robust financial system facilitates the process of SOE reform, spurring the financial 
and operating efficiency of firms by introducing market monitoring. Second, it 
allows the sustained growth of the private sector by supplying capital to finance 
innovative projects. Third, it provides better diversification opportunities for 
domestic and international investors. 
 
A well-designed privatization process can target these important objectives. A 
government endowed with a rich portfolio of assets can structure a suitable transfer 
program of ownership rights to the private sector to shift the market away from an 
underdevelopment trap. In what follows, we will try to advise on the most 
appropriate strategies to foster capital market development via privatization in PRC. 
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7.2 The present financial and institutional landscape of SOE reform 
 
PRC has already taken important steps in SOE reform and capital market 
development. Therefore in advising on the future of State sell-offs, it is important to 
take stock of previous experience and current developments in the economic and 
institutional setting. 
 
The first wave of IPOs and the liquidity trap. During the 1990s, PRC has witnessed 
a dramatic growth in the domestic stock market. Since the establishment of the two 
major stock exchanges in 1990 and 1991, more than 1,300 firms went public 
contributing to a combined market capitalization of RMB3.8trn. The increase in 
market size has been largely due to the floatation of newly corporatized SOEs. 
Indeed, as of 2002 only 15 percent of stocks are associated with private 
corporations. The majority of these deals were capital raising issues in primary 
markets, with a limited dilution of government ownership. 
 
The sheer size of Chinese stock markets masks an important weakness: the free 
float, i.e. the shares freely tradable in the stock market, are worth only 35 percent of 
the total capitalization. Only 6 percent of listed companies have more than 40 
percent of their total equity in tradable shares. State shares and legal person shares 
remain non-tradable even if the company is listed. This peculiar feature of the 
ownership structure of Chinese listed firms  has important consequences in the 
intrinsic quality of the stock market, which is highly illiquid, volatile, and subject to 
market manipulation and insider dealing. The higher risks involved in equity 
investment partly explain the over-valuation of A-shares, trading on average at 
much higher P/E ratios than shares traded in Hong Kong or in major financial 
centres such as NYSE or LSE.  
 
Bell-weather stocks listed in foreign exchanges. While less valuable SOEs were 
floated domestically, better performing companies successfully tapped international 
investors in major foreign exchanges. As of March 2004, 49 Chinese companies 
have accomplished an American Depository Receipt program in the US, and 16 are 
fully listed at NYSE, complying to GAAP accounting standards and SEC 
regulations. Five companies are listed at LSE. As of February 2004, 96 companies 
(H and Red Chips) are listed in Hong Kong, and are worth 30 percent of total 
market capitalization. 
 
This policy probably allowed to maximize the total number of SOEs listed in a 
given time. Indeed, more profitable firms were the only ones which could 
successfully tap international exchanges. Dual listing at home and abroad these 
SOEs would have crowded out the less profitable ones, given the limited absorption 
capacity of the domestic market at the initial stage of the process. Furthermore, 
foreign IPOs would have attracted foreign capital and hard currency. Domestic 
IPOs would have entailed only a transfer of national resources from investors to 
SOEs. Finally, a foreign listing in highly reputed exchanges would have provided a 
credible certification, and improved corporate governance. 
 
Centralization of decision making. We have learnt from the Italian experience that 
the dispersion of decision-making and political interference at various levels of the 
public administration have been major sources of inefficiency in the public control   37
of SOEs. The PRC has already taken important steps to rationalize the 
administration of the SOE sector with the establishment of the State-owned Asset 
Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), a ministerial authority 
performing the responsibilities of the investor in 189 large groups owned by the 
central government. Among the main statutory functions and responsibilities, 
SASAC is charged to push forward the reform of the state sector and to propel the 
strategic adjustment of the state economy. Should a large-scale transfer of 
ownership rights to the private sector be eventually launched, SASAC will certainly 
be one of the key actors involved. The high level of centralization of decision 
making should ensure the consistent implementation of a long term strategy aimed 
at capital market development, in a similar spirit to Italian experience of the MEF. 
The establishment of SASAC also represents a crucial step in the improvement of 
state governance, as it separates the government’s role in regulation and state asset 
management. 
 
Improvement in corporate governance. Important innovations have recently taken 
place in the institutional landscape, and particularly in corporate governance 
systems. In 2000, the Shanghai Stock Exchange issued the guidelines for the 
corporate governance of listed firms, followed by the publication of the code of 
corporate governance by the CSRC in 2002.  The legal and regulatory environment 
has substantially improved, forcing listed companies to disclose related party 
transactions and to improve board independence. As of February 2004, CSRS has 
issued a new set listing rules, replacing the cumbersome conduit system. Under the 
new “sponsorship system”, the registered sponsors (2 registered bankers from the 
underwriter) will play the role of the gate-keeper and will be held responsible for 
the behavior of each sponsored  firm for a period of 2 years from IPO. Due to the 
higher risks, investment banks will probably require a large premium for the 
underwriting business. Therefore the underwriting business will inevitably 
concentrate into few major securities firms. Nevertheless, these measures should 
consolidate the foundations of the market. By enhancing accountability and 
responsibility, the new system should improve governance and investor protection, 
sustain the profitability of listed companies in the after-market, deepen securities 
market, and develop institutional investors. 
 
Gradual capital market opening. The metamorphosis of the Italian financial system 
would not have occurred absent the involvement of foreign investors in the 
privatization process. We have seen that foreign investors invested massively in 
privatized stocks, also backing the domestic equity shift by underwriting 
government backed securities. Foreign investors (and particularly institutional 
investors) did not provide only capital, but expertise and assistance to domestic 
financial intermediaries in the implementation of a process meeting international 
standards.  
 
Important steps in terms of gradual capital market opening to overseas investors 
have already been made in PRC. The 2002 Securities Investment Fund Law allows 
the establishment of foreign joint-ventures, with the foreign firm allowed to 
underwrite up to 33 (and after 2 years 49) percent of capital. Importantly, as of 
December 2002, Qualifying Foreign Institutional Investors (QFII) are granted 
access to the A-share capital market with a capped investment of US$800ml. CSRS 
has recently licensed a first batch of QFII meeting the required criteria, and several   38
other applications are in course of evaluation. The consolidation of this new trend 
of the foreign portfolio investment is one of the major challenges facing PRC 
should it embark in a large-scale privatization program. 
 
 
7.3 Principles  
 
PRC has already taken fundamental steps to foster market development and the 
private sector. The aim of this section is to advise on how PRC could leverage on 
these important results, and to identify the most appropriate strategies to 
consolidate financial market development via the transfer of ownership rights in 
SOEs to the private sector. 
 
A caveat is in order. In suggesting these policy recommendations, we assume that 
domestic financial market development is the main objective of the SOE reform 
process. Alternative strategies for the transfer of SOE shares aimed at different 
goals are therefore not considered. For example, direct sales in the form of private 
equity placement to strategic investors are certainly the most suitable strategies in 
order to maximize sale proceeds, especially when conducted through auctions and 
OTC transactions. However, these sales typically involve the complete transfer of 
ownership and control to private investors and do not affect directly financial 
market development. 
 
With this proviso, on the basis of the Italian and international experience, we 
believe that a policy of SOE reform aimed at domestic stock market development 
should predicate upon the following principles. 
 
A.  Better performing SOEs should be given higher priority to share issue 
privatization. A stock market without shares of well performing firms is like 
a “sourceless river”, which is doomed to dry out. In fact, there are already 
many important SOEs with strong growth prospects in the domestic Chinese 
markets. However, it seems that the present numbers are not sufficient to 
generate critical mass effects. Financial engineering cannot provide 
substitutes and hedge risks efficiently without an adequate number of high 
quality stocks. The implementation of this principle has an important 
implication in terms of re-organization and restructuring. At the beginning 
of the process, the government, and likely SASAC, should adopt a “best 
foot forward policy” with better performing companies put first in the 
pipeline, and manage the restructuring of less performing SOEs burdened 
by redundant workers and social obligations.  
 
B.  The overhang of non-tradable shares should be addressed. The first stage of 
SOE reform in PRC involved the corporatization of SOEs and capital 
raising IPOs in domestic and international markets. However, such primary 
issues do not involve a substantial dilution of state ownership in firms. The 
Italian experience has shown that major improvements in the financial and 
operating performance of SOE occur only if ownership rights are truly 
transferred from the State to the private sector. The shift to secondary 
offerings does not imply that ownership and control of SOE should be 
completely transferred to the private sector. Even partial privatization (i.e.   39
the sale of a minority stake of 20, 30 percent of capital) can have significant 
effects in improving incentives in SOEs, gradually bringing the size of the 
SOE sector in PRC closer to the physiological levels of more advanced 
market economies. 
 
C.  Insider privatization should be minimized. The Italian experience has shown 
that in order to fully garner the benefits of privatization, the process should 
be open, competitive and transparent. In that direction, it is advisable to 
limit the bargaining with insiders (i.e. managers and employees) at the 
privatization stage. Indeed, management buy-outs (MBO) are therefore less 
likely to occur at fair values given that one party enjoys private information, 
and therefore should be limited to exceptional cases. On the other hand, 
sales should be designed to attract outsiders, such as retail, institutional, 
strategic, and foreign investors, and all those stakeholders interested in the 
maximization of the value of the assets. 
 
D.  Legal and institutional framework for privatization should be strengthened. 
The recent financial crises in Asia and Latin America highlighted  the risks 
connected with the decision to privatize “quickly and at all costs” in the 
mistaken conviction that, after the sale, markets and institutions would 
automatically come into being. More successful experiences, such as the 
Italian one, have proved that privatization is a necessary, but not sufficient 
condition for capital market development, and that intentional structural 




7.4 Reshaping the SOE sector to foster capital market development  
 
The implementation of the principles stated above translates directly into some 
policy recommendations, which obviously have to be tailor-made to possible 
operations on a case-by-case basis. 
 
Taking stock of the Italian experience and previous SOE reforming efforts in PRC, 
the main issues to strategically design a privatization policy aimed at capital market 
development are the following. 
 
 
A. The privatization law. PRC is certainly capable of implementing share issue 
privatizations without a formal privatization law. However, the enactment of such a 
law could provide institutional commitment and credibility, which are important 
elements for the final success of the sales and for the state’s management of SOEs 
in a transparent and effective manner. 
 
The law should establish the principles and the objectives of the program, its 
methods, and procedures. A fundamental aspect of this law involves the allocation 
of proceeds. It seems sensible to advise that proceeds raised from the transfer of 
non-tradable shares to the private sector have to be remitted to the central or to the 
local government. The Italian case suggests that it is important to restrain by law 
the use of these revenues, and possibly create special funds according to the fiscal   40
priorities of the government. In the case of PRC, it seems sensible to allocate a part 
of these resources to a fund covering pension liabilities of the PAYG system. 
 
B. The timing of sales. Starting with the right sequence of sales is crucial for the 
eventual success of a large-scale privatization program. Indeed, botched sales at the 
beginning of the process may jeopardize the feasibility of the entire program thus 
governments should be quite risk averse at the initial stage. 
 
The Italian case-study  has shown that a proper timing for the transfer of shares of 
SOEs is the following: banks first, then SOEs operating under competitive 
conditions, and finally regulated utilities. 
 
Clearly bank privatization is one of the key drivers of the modernization of the 
financial system. In more advanced market economies, a competitive banking 
system favors the allocation of savings to the most productive investments, spurring 
economic growth. Importantly, strong financial intermediaries will specialize in 
asset management and investment banking services, which are essential ingredients 
of capital market development and of the successful privatization of non-financial 
firms. The central government of PRC has recently decided to let the four largest 
state-owned banks (China Construction Bank, Bank of China, the Industrial and 
Commercial Bank, and the Agricultural Bank) go public in the next two years. 
These listings – especially if coupled with a substantial transfer of state’s shares -  
will certainly introduce a monitoring component in the operating activity of firms 
and improve corporate governance. However, the Italian experience shows that 
major improvements in the quality of the banks’ assets can be achieved only if 
privatization curbs political interference and cleans up a culture long based on bail-
out schemes. Indeed, state subsides to ailing firms have been responsible for the 
abnormal accumulation of public debt over the 1980s. The radical change in  bank 
managers’ mentality has been pushed by the awareness that making loans to ailing 
sister SOEs was likely to lead to financial collapse.  
 
Once the  privatization of financial intermediaries is well advanced, PRC could 
push forward the process in competitive sectors. In order to fully garner the benefits 
of privatization, it would be important to postpone the transfer of shares in utilities 
at a more advanced stage, when a clear regulatory framework is established and the 
dual role of the state as shareholder and regulator is separated by a suitable 
institutional design. Selling unregulated monopolies and network industries is 
obviously a bad choice, as public monopolies are turned private and rents are then 
more difficult to dismantle. 
 
C. Multi-tranche offerings. Multi-tranche offerings on public equity markets are a 
very flexible instrument which can be structured to meet the seller’s objectives. The 
government (with the assistance of its advisors) can divide the offering between a 
retail and institutional tranche, and shape the international profile of the issue by 
involving foreign retail and/or institutional investors. 
 
Under the assumption that one the main objectives in PRC is capital market 
development, it seems sensible to suggest that shares are preferentially allocated to 
domestic retail investors. Tapping domestic investors with high quality offerings 
would allow to foster popular ownership of productive assets in PRC. The domestic   41
floatation of the Shangai Baosteel Group Corporation represents an important 
precedent of this kind of strategic choice. The international and Italian experience 
has shown that this is the appropriate strategy to boost domestic liquidity, which is 
related to the likelihood of informed trading. Fixed price offerings in combination 
with bonus shares and strategic underpricing could be fine-tuned to entice even 
low and middle income classes to participate in the process. Obviously, 
underpricing will negatively affect revenue generation. 
 
Even if it appears advisable to earmark a large proportion of shares to domestic 
retail investors, the involvement of institutional investors is also crucial to achieve 
a more accurate pricing of shares and price stabilization in the after-market. For 
that purpose, the green shoe option should be foreseen. 
 
Foreign investment banks have a wide expertise on this kind of deals. It would 
therefore be advisable to include in the underwriting syndicate one or more major 
foreign institutions to be selected from league tables. PRC security firms, well 
acquainted with the peculiarities of the domestic environment,  will co-operate with 
foreign firms and will learn how to execute transactions meeting international 
standards. 
 
The supply of shares of high quality SOEs in the domestic market should boost 
capital market development and provide improved investment opportunities to 
institutional investors, especially investment and pension funds, which could also 
become active shareholders in SOEs, with positive spill-overs in corporate 
governance.  
 
When the SOE to be floated needs an additional “certification” for quality, 
dual/multiple listings in domestic and international exchanges should be considered. 
In that case, the offering should foresee a limited amount of shares of the retail 
tranche floated via ADR/GDR (American/Global Depository Receipts) programs at 
NYSE or London. Should these listings abroad be considered too expensive, cross-
listing in Hong Kong can also be taken into account.  
 
An important option to foster domestic stock market development would entail the 
repatriation of SOEs already listed abroad. A transfer of the shares of these 
companies in the A-market would certainly be welcome given the high reputation 
and previous performance. By the same token, floating shares only abroad should 
be avoided. 
 
Multi-tranche offerings could also foresee an allocation of shares to a group of 
stable shareholders. A certain degree of ownership concentration may be important 
for an effective post-sale management. However, in negotiation the terms of the 
transfer of shares to hard-core shareholders, the government should take into the 
control premium associated with large shareholdings, as substantial benefits usually 
accrue to controlling shareholders in large publicly listed corporations.  
 
D. The pricing of non-tradable shares. The present stalemate in SOE reform and 
market development seems to be largely determined by the difficulty in finding a 
general agreement on the pricing of non-tradable shares. The main concern is the 
negative price impact of the transfer of these shares on the A-market. A consensus   42
is emerging to avoid top-down solutions and to let floating and non-floating 
shareholders strike a deal on the price discount on non-tradable shares. A possible 
solution is to give veto power to floating shareholders. Thus share transfer 
conditions would be approved by the majority of floating shareholders. 
 
This approach appears to be based on the assumption that any transfer of non-
tradable shares will cause a negative price impact due to stock overhang. However, 
the transfer program could be designed to minimize this negative price effect. 
Basically, the negative effect on prices of the increased supply of shares can be 
counterbalanced by an exogenous increase in the demand of these shares. Possible 
factors which could shift forward the demand for stocks are the following. The first 
one is the liquidity premium. A higher liquidity of the stock due to the larger free 
float provided by the transfer program will reduce risk premia, which will be 
discounted on prices. Ellul and Pagano (1992) show that investors are also 
concerned by expected liquidity and by the uncertainty about its level when shares 
are traded on the after-market. The more liquid shares are expected to be, and the 
more predictable their liquidity is, the smaller will be the amount of “money left on 
the table” by the issuer. As a consequence, price discounts should take into account 
this liquidity premium. The second one is the quality premium. Following the 
principles set forth in section 7.3, our policy recommendation is based on the 
transfer of shares of high quality shares, for which there is strong demand by new 
classes of shareholders, which may not be the present floating shareholders. Among 
these,  domestic institutional investors (especially mutual funds and asset 
management companies) together with foreign investors will contribute to push 
forward the demand for non-tradable shares. The combined effect of the liquidity 
and the quality premium could in principle compensate (at least partly) the negative 
effect of stock overhang. 
 
An important outstanding issue concerns the allocation of resources from state 
asset’s disposals to the NSSF. A previous (now abandoned) policy has been to 
allocate a part of privatization revenues from IPOs to finance NSSF. Should the 
funding of NSSF still be considered a priority, PRC should consider alternative and 
more efficient transfer schemes. A viable alternative could be the transformation of 
the legal status from non-tradable into tradable shares and the outright transfer of 
these shares to the NSSF. This policy would allow to save transaction costs (the 
“bid-ask-spread”), to endow the NSSF of a portfolio of assets to be managed 
professionally on behalf of individual employees, and to turn NSSF into an 
influential institutional investor in PRC. 
 
E. Golden shares mechanism. As long as the process advances, the transfer policy 
of non-tradable shares may substantially dilute the ownership rights of the 
government of PRC. The corresponding increase in the free float would enhance 
the contestability of listed SOEs, enhancing corporate valuation by the threat of 
take-overs and exposure to stock market discipline. However, in some cases, the 
government of PRC may prefer to maintain some degree of control of SOEs after 
privatization. The Italian case-study has shown that in that case special rights can 
be granted to the public shareholder and that statutory constraints can be introduced 
in the company bylaws. The so-called golden shares mechanisms could give veto 
power to the government of the PRC over domestic and foreign acquisitions and 
some company decisions even in fully privatized companies. As a rule, these   43
special rights should not be arbitrary but rather well specified in the framework 
privatization law. 
 
F.  Concurrent measures to foster stock market development. We have already 
mentioned the importance of institutional reform and regulatory design for 
successful SOE reform and privatization. As to PRC, corporate governance 
mechanisms need to be improved to ensure that our policy recommendations 
achieve the desired outcomes.  PRC has made important steps in the right direction 
to improve corporate governance in listed firms. However, shareholders’ and 
creditors’ rights should be further strengthened, and conversely political 
interference and insider control curbed. Related party transactions should be more 
severely regulated and disclosed. The enforcement mechanisms should also be 
improved, possibly introducing derivative suits against management malpractices. 
The independence of the board of directors should be strengthened. Finally, 
information disclosure and accounting standards should be perfected to ensure 
transparency and fairness. 
 
Should this set of policy recommendations be consistently implemented, we believe 
that capital market could further develop and deepen for the prosperity of the 
Chinese economy. 
 
8  Conclusions 
 
 
The privatization process at the global scale experienced an exponential growth 
during the 1990s, reaching a top value in 1999 with SOE assets sold worth around 
$180bn. From that climax, privatization activity has fallen sharply at an annual 
average rate of around 60 percent, reaching a value of $49bn in 2003. The most 
recent data for 2004 confirm this negative trend. Similar figures date back to the mid-
1980s, at times when the UK was the only country seriously involved in privatization . 
 
The big privatization cycle of the 1990s is thus over. Several factors could explain the 
abrupt slowing down of the process. First, global economic recession associated with 
falling stock prices made privatization more difficult, as governments were obviously 
reluctant to sell their shares in a depressed market. Second, while privatizing the first 
tranche is a win-win solution for governments, as it allows to boost performance in 
SOEs without relinquishing control, the second tranche usually raises serious political 
issues. Indeed, full privatization means a complete roll-back of the State as owner of 
productive assets, a step which only few governments are willing to take especially 
for companies deemed strategic for the national economy. 
 
Given the sheer number and size of SOEs in PRC, China will likely be one of the 
main actors in future privatization. A conservative estimate of the value of non-
tradable shares of Chinese SOEs yields $2trn, about twice the total amount globally 
raised in the last three decades. This figure suggests that even a few large-scale sales 
from PRC could shake out privatization from the present stalemate. 
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This is quite a favorable moment to design a large scale privatization program. Global 
economic recovery, which is expected in the forthcoming years, should gradually 
raise market prices and provide new opportunities for divestiture at fair values. An 
appropriate timing of sales could therefore allow governments to achieve their 
revenue generation targets. 
 
Importantly, international investors currently have positive expectations about the 
future prospects of the Chinese economy as an engine for growth and global recovery. 
The strong interest towards PRC is reinforced by the weakening of the US and 
especially Europe, where investment opportunities have also been curbed by the 
slowing down of privatization activity. PRC therefore has the potential to attract a 
large amount of foreign funds, which could be targeted to sustain domestic 
investments. 
 
Privatization and SOE reform are fundamental elements of this long term strategy. A 
carefully designed program, combined with intentional structural reform, could foster 
domestic financial market development, allowing a more efficient linking of savings 
to investments and spurring long term growth. 
 
In this direction, PRC could take stock in a pragmatic way of more than 20 years of 
privatization experience in developed and emerging markets, drawing also some 
lessons from Italy, where results have been quite remarkable. 
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Figure 2. The Control of State-Owned Enterprises as of 1992
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(1) It was also controlling Aeroporti di Roma. (2) It was also controlling Autostrade and 
Italimpianti. (3) They also controlled SCI, that owned 51% of Alcantara. (4) It was also controlling 
Montefibre,l’EniChem Augusta and Inca Intern. (5) It was also controlling activities in the carbon 
sector. (6) It was also controlling Segisa (Newspaper Editor) and Nuova Same. (7) It was also 
controlling a number of hotels and touristic activities. (8) It was also controlling Comital and 
Eurallumina.  9) It was also controlling Agusta and  Breda Costruzioni Ferroviarie.  
 
Source: IRI (2001) 
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Figure 5.1 Revenues from Privatization in Italy and around the World (1977- 2003) 
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Figure 9. Number of Applications for Shares in Major Public Offers
Source: Ministry of The Economy and Finance
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Figure 11. Companies with shares listed in Italian Stock Exchange 
Number of Companies Source: World Federation of Exchanges

















































































































































































































































Privatrade Trade Source: Datastream































































































































Figure 16. The Equity shift, 1992-2000 (Value in Italian Liras mil) 
 
Note: Figures in parentheses refer to 1992 
Source: IRI (2001) 
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Figure 17. Allocation by Institutional Investors, 1999 
Equity Bonds Liquid assets Source: AssogestioniTable 1. Major Italian Privatizations (1985-2003) 
Panel A . Preliminary Stage (1985 – 1992) 
Date 
 





Type of Deal 
01/06/85  Sirti SpA  Construction  ---------  40.00  111   PO 
25/10/85  STET  Telephone Communication  ---------    103   PO 
01/12/85  ALITALIA  Transportation  ---------  22.00  328   PO 
01/12/85  Banca Commerciale Italiana SpA  Commercial Bank  ---------  16.00  308   PO 
18/11/88  Mediobanca SpA  Commercial Bank  ---------  13.30  230   PO 
30/06/89  Italiana Telecomunicazioni SpA  Communications Equipment  American Telephone & Telegraph  20.00  255   PS 
11/09/89  Enimont SpA  Manufacturing  Retail or Institutional  20.00  360   PO 
29/12/89  CREDIOP  Commercial Banks, Bank Holding Companies  Istituto Bancario San Paolo di Torino  40.00  956   PS 
31/01/90  Banco di Santo Spirito SpA  Commercial Banks, Bank Holding Companies  Cassa di Risparmio di Roma  51.00  523   PS 
31/10/90  Banco di Perugia  Commercial Banks, Bank Holding Companies  BMPS  70.60  103   PS 
28/06/91  STET  Telephone Communication  Retail or Institutional  7.60  256   PO 
01/10/91  CREDIOP  Commercial Banks, Bank Holding Companies  Istituto Bancario San Paolo di Torino  50.00  1,684   PS 
Total           5,215   12 
 
Panel B . Start-up Stage (1992 – 1995) 
Date 
 





Type of Deal 
24/04/92  Sidermar di Navigazione SpA  Transportation and Shipping (except air)  Cie Monegasque Bk Monte Carlo  49.00  113   PS 
01/06/92  EFIM-Tax Credits  Investment & Commodity Firms, Dealers, Exchanges  Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co  50.00  248   PS 
12/06/92  STET  Telephone Communication  ---------  16.00  593   PO 
18/12/92  Pavesi  Food and Kindred Products  Barilla G&R Flli SpA  41.00  128   PS 
31/12/92  Ilva-Acciaierie Piombino  Metal and Metal Products  Lucchini Siderurgica  60.00  380   PS 
09/12/93  Credito Italiano SpA  Commercial Bank  ---------  67.10  990   PO 
08/02/94  IMI 1  Commercial Bank  ---------  33.00  1,573   PO 
10/03/94  Banca Commerciale Italiana SpA  Commercial Bank  ---------  54.30  1,630   PO 
06/04/94  Bertolli   Food and Kindred Products  Unilever NV  100.00  108   PS 
25/06/94  INA  Insurance  ---------  53.50  2,690   Convertible Bonds 
30/06/94  Acciai Speciali Terni  Metal and Metal Products  Kai Italia Srl  100.00  716   PS 
01/09/95  INA  Insurance  ---------  18.37  936   PO 
28/09/95  Aeroporti di Roma  Air Transportation and Shipping  Investor Group  56.20  262   PS 
20/11/95  ENI 1  Natural Resource  ---------  14.70  3,949   PO 
26/12/95  Ilva Servizi Energia  Electric, Gas, and Water Distribution  Investor Group  73.96  228   PS 
Total           14,544   15 Panel C . “Core Stage” (1996 – 2000) 
Date 
 





Type of Deal 
04/01/96  INCA Intl  Rubber and Miscellaneous Plastic Products  Dow Italia Spa (Dow Chemicals)  80.00  300   PS 
19/03/96  Nuova Tirrena  Insurance  Toro Assicurazioni SpA  91.14  372   PS 
29/03/96  Alumix-Extrusion Division  Metal and Metal Products  Aluminum Co of America   100.00  280   PS 
07/07/96  IMI 3  Commercial Bank  ---------  6.93  326   PO 
04/10/96  Amga SpA  Water Supply  ---------  49.00  129   PO 
28/10/96  ENI2  Natural Resource  ---------  8.75  3,698   PO 
31/01/97  Alfa Romeo Avio  Aerospace and Aircraft  FiatAvio Inc  77.50  131   PS 
24/05/97  Istituto Bancario San Paolo di Torino  Commercial Bank  ---------  48.00  1,255   PO 
30/06/97  ENI 3  Natural Resource  ---------  12.50  7,237   PO 
15/07/97  Aeroporti di Roma  Transportation  ---------  45.00  327   PO 
25/10/97  Telecom Italia 1  Telephone Communication  ---------  44.70  9,465   PO 
29/11/97  Banca di Roma  Commercial Bank  ---------  36.50  1,316   PO 
12/02/98  MAC  Telecommunications  Marconi (Marconi Finanziaria)  50.00  161   PS 
16/03/98  Saipem SpA  Natural Resource  ---------  26.00  553   PO 
18/05/98  ALITALIA  Transportation  ---------  18.30  448   PO 
05/06/98  Finmeccanica SpA  Manufacturing  ---------    1,129   PO 
27/06/98  ENI 4  Natural Resource  ---------  14.30  6,643   PO 
11/07/98  Azienda Electrica Municipale  Electric Service  ---------  49.00  744   PO 
06/10/98  Lloyd Triestino Di Navigazione  Transportation and Shipping (except air)  Evergreen Marine Corp  100.00  227   PS 
21/11/98  BNL  Commercial Bank  Hard Core Shareholders  59.50  4,208   PO 
19/06/99  Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena  Commercial Bank  ---------  24.30  2,093   PO 
10/07/99  ACEA SpA  Electric Service  ---------  49.00  848   PO 
31/10/99  Autostrade SpA  Transportation and Shipping (except air)  Hard Core Shareholders  30.00  2,533   PS 
02/11/99  ENEL 1  Electric Service  ---------  32.00  16,447   PO 
04/12/99  Autostrade SpA  Transportation  ---------  56.00  3,797   PO 
11/04/00  Insicem  Chemicals and Allied Products  Colacem SpA  100.00  127   PS 
03/06/00  Finmeccanica SpA  Manufacturing  ---------  54.00  4,686   PO 
20/10/00  Basictel  Telecommunications  Albacom  60.00  101   PS 
24/11/00  AEM Torino SpA  Electric Service  ---------  26.00  235   PO 




 Panel D. Consolidation Stage (2000 – 2003) 
Date 
 





Type of Deal 
07/02/01  COFIRI  Investment & Commodity Firms, Dealers, Exchanges  Investor Group  100.00  423   PS 
15/02/01  ENI 5  Natural Resource  ---------  5.00  2,183   PO 
17/02/01  Acegas  Electric Service  ---------  41.85  140   PO 
29/03/01  Enel SpA-Rome Network  Electric, Gas, and Water Distribution  ACEA SpA  100.00  501   PS 
24/09/01  Elettrogen SpA  Electric, Gas, and Water Distribution  Investor Group  100.00  3,198   PS 
31/05/02  Eurogen SpA  Electric, Gas, and Water Distribution  Edipower SpA (Edison SpA)  100.00  3,562   PS 
09/12/02  Telecom Italia 2  Telephone Communication  ---------  3.50  1,381   PO 
21/06/03  HERA  Electric Service  ---------  38.68  429   PO 
30/10/03  ENEL SpA  Electric Service  ---------  6.60  2,520   PO 
23/12/03  Ente Tabacchi Italiani SPA  Tobacco Products  British American Tobacco PLC  100.00  2,608   PS 
30/12/03  Cassa Depositi e Prestiti  Credit Institutions  Investor Group  30.00  1,302   PS 
Total           18,247   11 
             
Note: This table reports the list of privatization transactions worth more than US$100mil 
Source: Securities Data Corporation 




















 Table 2. Privatization in developed countries 
           
Country  Deals  Revenues 
(US$1995) 
Rev/GDP  Stock  PO/ Revenues  
           
Japan  17  187,708.40   0.03  0.15  1.00 
UK  215  133,635.28   0.10  0.91  0.82 
Italy  113  98,275.28   0.08  0.63  0.86 
Germany  151  77,752.34   0.03  0.79  0.65 
France  97  58,633.64   0.03  0.68  0.95 
Australia  131  58,054.89   0.13  0.93  0.41 
Spain  88  48,626.92   0.07  0.65  0.78 
Portugal  77  26,691.79   0.21  0.52  0.83 
Sweden  51  18,970.51   0.07  0.77  0.73 
Netherlands  28  18,736.94   0.04  0.59  0.68 
Finland  55  18,404.17   0.11  0.59  0.68 
USA  38  12,519.94  0.00 0.97  0.51
Canada  57  11,439.49   0.02  0.81  0.47 
Hong Kong  19  11,187.14   0.07  0.49  0.91 
Austria  47  9,597.65   0.04  0.65  0.48 
South Korea  20  9,588.22   0.06  0.16  0.96 
Greece  37  8,005.71   0.06  0.51  0.80 
Norway  29  7,979.26   0.05  0.64  0.29 
New Zealand  42  7,697.39   0.11  0.88  0.12 
Switzerland  6  7,014.30   0.02  0.54  0.96 
Belgium  15  6,675.09   0.02  0.53  0.19 
Ireland  14  5,811.79   0.06  0.64  0.71 
Israel  36  5,379.36   0.05  0.38  0.78 
Denmark  7  3,533.31   0.02  0.66  1.00 
Singapore  25  3,308.30   0.03  0.54  0.92 
           
Average  57  34,209.08   0.06  0.62  0.70 
           
Source: Elaboration on Privatisation International, Securities Data Corporation, and World Development Indicators (World Bank 
2002) 
 
Note: This table reports the aggregate figures on privatization in 25 "developed" countries for the 1977-2000 period. Countries are 
ranked by Total Revenues form privatization as of  2000 in constant 1995US$. Deals is the total number of privatizations. 
Revenues is total revenues (in US$ mil 1995) from total privatizations. Rev/GDP is the ratio of total revenues cumulated in the 
period to 2000GDP (in US$ mil 1995). Stock is the average of the positive values of the yearly weighed average of privatized 










Table 3. Largest Banks' Return on Equity 
%  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000 
               
Germany  7.2  8.4  9.3  8.2  10.8  8.3  11.9 
US  14.9  15.6  15.7  16.1  19.5  19.8  15.0 
France  1.4  4.0  7.6  9.6  9.0  14.4  18.0 
Italy  1.8  2.7  2.4  0.5  8.6  11.4  12.8 
UK  21.3  19.6  20.2  19.4  18.8  20.2  20.1 
Sources: Bankscope & BNP Paribas 
 Table 4. Public Ownership in Banks 
(in % of total assets) 
         
Country  1992  1994 
(1)  1997  2000 
         
France  36.0  36.0  31.0  n.d 
Germany  61.9  52.0  52.0  n.d. 
Italy 
(2)  74.5  62.0  36.0  0.1 
UK  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
US  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
   
(1) 1995 for Italy 
(2) 1997 and 2000 data did not include stock holding by foundations which, according to Italian law, are private entities 





































ENI 1 (*)  Nov. 1995  3.30  4.38          819          401   2.04 
ENI2  Oct. 1996  7.48  7.91          743          700   1.06 
ENI3  Jun.1997  7.04  8.69       1,578          858   1.84 
Telecom Italia   Oct. 1997  -0.47  2.28       2,922       1,450   2.02 
ENI 4  Jun. 1998  4.51  3.10       1,466          891   1.65 
BNL  Nov. 1998  11.54  8.37       2,600          662   3.93 
ENEL (*)  Oct. 1999  0.32  0.32       4,748       2,425   1.96 
Autostrade  Dec. 1999  0.15  -0.55          903          491   1.84 
             
(*) IPOs 













 Table 6. Underpricing in Fixed - Price Offerings 




















Privatizations   15  15.4  6    0.9  1.2  9    4.5  3.5  15 
World 
Privatizations
(2)  34.1  12.4  242    9.4  3.3  55    29.1  8.6  303 
 
1 % calculated as the difference between the first day quote after the issue and the offer price, divided by the offer  
price 
2Jones et al. (1999), for the period 1977-1997 
 






 Table 7. Allocation of Shares in Major Share Issue Privatizations 
 





Retail  -  of which  Institutions  -  of which 
        Domestic Employees US  Italy  UK & 
Ireland 
Europe  USA  RoW 
       
Credito Italiano   58.10 3.30 62.17  91.00  9.00  0.00  37.82   
Banca Comemrciale Italiana Spa  54.30 3.00 61.00  89.00  11.00  0.00  39.00   
IMI 1  27.90 1.13 82.00  66.00  40.00  31.00  18.00  83.00  0.00  0.00  17.00  0.00 
ENI 1  14.70 0.07 55.42  52.00  9.00  40.00  44.58  66.00  34.00 
(1)  0.00  0.00 
(1) 
ENI 2  15.82 0.75 68.52  71.00  10.00  19.00  31.48  32.00  35.00  0.00  0.00  32.00 
IMI 3  6.94 0.00 0.00  -  -  -  100.00  45.00  19.00  27.00  6.00  4.00 
Banca di Roma  36.50 0.00 79.50  92.00  8.00  0.00  20.50   
ENI 3  17.60 1.53 75.14  75.00  6.00  19.00  24.86  46  31.00  0.00  0.00  23.00 
Istituto Bancario San Paolo di Torino  3.36 1.47 48.00  83.00  17.00  0.00  52.00  100 
(2)  0.00  0.00  0.00 
(2) 
BNL  68.27 2.11 59.40  91.00  9.00  0.00  40.60  39.00  0.00  0.00  11.00  50.00 
ENI 4  14.83 1.10 84.52  88.00  5.00  7.00  15.48  54.00  35.00  0.00  0.00  11.00 
Autostrade Spa  56.00 4.10 79.10  100.00  -  0.00  10.20   
ENEL 1  31.74 1.00 68.49  93.00  7.00  1.00  31.51  41.00  14.00  30.00  10.00  5.00 
TI 1  42.10 1.95 87.11  85.00  11.00  4.00  12.89  33.00  15.00  0.00  20.00  33.00 
ENI 5  5.00 - 0.00  -  -  -  100.00   
TI 2  3.00 - 0.00  -  -  -  100.00  16.00  48.00  14.00  18.00  4.00 
ENEL 2  6.60 - 0.00  -  -  -  100.00  6.00  46.00  26.00  20.00  2.00 
                   
Mean  27.22 1.54 53.55  83.00  12.00  8.00  45.82  43.00  0.22  8.00  8.00  19.00 
 
 
(1) (UK + RoW) 
(2) (Italy + RoW) 
* as a percentage of stock capital 
 
           
Note: these data include the green-shoe 





 Table 8. Investors’ Protection around the World 
Countries and  
Legal Origin 






Australia  4 
Canada  5 
New Zealand  4 
Singapore  4 
South Africa  5 
Thailand  2 
UK  5 
USA  5 
   
Mean  4.25 
 
French Civil law 
 
 
Argentina  4 
Belgium  0 
Brazil  3 
Chile  5 
Colombia  3 
France  3 
Greece  2 
Italy  1->4 
Mexico  1 
The Netherlands  2 
Portugal  3 
Spain  4 
   
Mean  2.73 
 
German and Scandinavian Civil Law 
 
 
Austria  2 
Germany  1 
Japan  4 
Switzerland  2 
Denmark  2 
Finland  3 
Norway  4 
Sweden  3 
   
Mean  2.63 
   


















privatized firms (%) 
 
Value of Trades 
of privatized 
firms (%) 
         
Australia  20  2  23  15 
Austria  26  23  42  38 
Belgium  3  1  10  18 
Canada  26  2  5  5 
Denmark  6  3  10  14 
Finland  22  14  8  9 
France  54  6  83  35 
Germany  20  2  19  9 
Ireland  4  4  12  - 
Italy  45  15  41  33 
Japan  16  1  6  4 
Netherlands  11  3  -  11 
New Zealand  7  4  30  48 
Norway  13  6  1  0 
Portugal  39  35  45  61 
Spain  24  2  54  52 
Sweden  10  3  10  5 
Switzerland  3  1  2  3 
UK  54  2  15  9 
USA  7  0  0  0 
Average  21  6  22  24 
         
Note: This table includes the end of period (31/12/2000) number of privatized firms, the number of privatized firms as a percentage
of the total number of firms quoted on the market, the market capitalization of privatized companies as a percentage of total market 
capitalization, and the value of trades of privatized firms 
 






Table 10. Share Ownership by Investor Type in  1992 and 2000 (Value in bn Liras) 
1992  2000  ∆ 
     
Nominal Value  %  Nominal Value  %   
           
Foreign Investors  17,010   7.0  223,408   14.6  7.6 
Institutional Investors   9,720   4.0  186,683   12.2  8.2 
Companies and Families   121,500   50.0  336,642   22.0  -28.0 
Banks  14,580   6.0  91,811   6.0  0.0 
State  19,440   8.0  156,079   10.2  2.2 
Foundations    n.d   n.d.  91,811   6.0  6.0 
Households   60,750   25.0  443,755   29.0  4.0 
 





 Table 11. The Distribution of Public Debt by Investor Type (Value in bn  Liras) 
1992  2000  ∆ 
     
Nominal Value  %  Nominal Value  %   
           
Foreign Investors         75,495   5.7       943,315   42.0  36.3 
Institutional Investors         70,133   5.3       485,950   21.6  16.3 
Companies and Families         48,537   3.7         33,241   1.5  -2.2 
Banks       341,321   25.8       217,861   9.7  -16.1 
State         19,212   1.5       151,555   6.7  5.3 
Households       766,250   58.0       414,066   18.4  -39.6 
           
 

























 Table 12. Institutional Investors  
 
  1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Mutual Funds  2.60 2.69 2.63 3.89 4.65 4.33  6.23 9.84 17.05 22.00 21.29 20.77 19.68 
Individual Portfolio Management  3.16 3.82 4.25 4.82 6.25 6.22  7.69 9.40 12.09 14.75 14.44 15.61 15.95 
Insurance Companies  1.93 2.17 2.50 2.39 3.01 3.52  3.86 4.13 4.57 5.48 6.15 7.46 9.06 
Pension Funds  3.23 3.32 3.24 2.89 3.28 3.27  2.92 2.61 2.43 2.91 2.87 2.30 2.30 
Total Household Financial Savings  116,026 142,192 162,736 103,715 163,323 177,031  357,417 500,065 740,964 948,864 979,592 983,827 982,324 
(%)  10.92 11.99 12.63 6.77 10.92 11.08  20.41 24.25 31.94 37.80 36.09 37.42 39.00 
 




























 Table 13. Mutual Funds Concentration of Italian Financial Groups 
2002  2001  2000  1999  1998 
First 3 Groups  0.502  0.511  0.515  0.397  0.32 
First 5 Groups  0.625  0.619  0.626  0.545  0.451 
First 10 Groups  0.793  0.792  0.808  0.758  0.684 
 







Table 14. Top 10 Asset Managers 2002 
   
Total Assets 
 
  Euro  
(ml)  %  Conc. 
 (%) 
Sanpaolo IMI  87,253.7  18.45  18.45 
Intesa BCI  87,070.3  18.41  36.86 
Unicredito Italiano  64,508.3  13.64  50.50 
Fineco - Gruppo Bancario Capitalia  32,282.1  6.83  57.33 
Arca  25,528.6  5.40  62.73 
Monte dei Paschi di Siena  19,150.5  4.05  66.78 
Banca Nazionale del Lavoro  17,497.1  3.70  70.48 
Banco Popolare di Verona e Novara  14,567.6  3.08  73.56 
Deutsche Bank  14,474.0  3.06  76.62 
Eptaconsors  13,108.2  2.77  79.39 
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